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CRIMINALIZING (POOR) FATHERHOOD 
Cortney E. Lollar* 
States prosecute and incarcerate thousands of fathers every year for failing to pay 
their child support obligations. Ostensibly, these prosecutions aim to foster the 
health and well-being of children without requiring the child’s mother to bear the 
costs of raising the child alone. What may appear on the surface to be a system that 
balances out inequities is actually a deeply flawed government program—one that 
promotes criminal recidivism and reinforces the poverty of indigent fathers. 
Contrary to the common image of a “deadbeat dad” raking in money and staying 
on the lam to avoid helping a mother raise their child, the vast majority of fathers 
who owe large amounts of child support make little to no income. These fathers do 
not pay their child support obligations because they are unable to. Once a state 
prosecutes and imprisons an indigent father, his odds of being able to pay that debt 
diminish even more. The criminalization of failing to pay child support is 
unconstitutional and revives prohibited debtors’ prisons. Fathers of lesser means 
are being incarcerated for failing to pay a private debt owed to their child’s mother 
or for not reimbursing the government for costs provided to the mother in the form 
of state assistance. In other words, an indigent father may be criminally sanctioned 
for not subsidizing the government’s welfare programs. Relying on antiquated ideas 
about a father’s role in the family, the child support system punishes poor fathers 
for their reproductive choices and morally condemns them for bringing a child into 
the world without being able to provide for her financially. This Article calls for an 
end to the criminalization of failing to pay child support and proposes several 
fiscally responsible changes to the current system that will improve the welfare of 
children whose parents are no longer together. 
INTRODUCTION 
On April 4, 2015, Walter Scott was pulled over in North Charleston, 
South Carolina, for driving with a broken taillight. As most people know 
by now, Mr. Scott fled on foot and was ultimately shot in the back by the 
police officer who pulled him over. Why did Mr. Scott run? According to 
 
* James & Mary Lassiter Associate Professor of Law, University of Kentucky College of Law. 
My deep gratitude to Albertina Antognini and Susan Appleton for their thoughtful comments and 
insights on earlier drafts, all of which challenged and expanded my thinking about the issues discussed 
herein. Thank you also to Richard Ausness, Joshua Barnette, Scott Bauries, Alexander Boni-Saenz, 
Christopher Bradley, Michael Cahill, Jenny Carroll, Mihailis Diamantis, Deborah Dinner, Jim 
Donovan, Martha Albertson Fineman, Ann Freedman, Timothy Grall, Meredith Harbach, David Kwok, 
Kate Levine, Donald J. Lollar, Anna Lund, Andrea McArdle, Melody Morales, Paul Salamanca, Nirej 
Sekhon, Rebecca Zietlow, and participants of CrimFest/AALS Midyear Meeting 2017, A Workshop on 
Legal Transitions and the Vulnerable Subject: Fostering Resilience through Law’s Dynamism, and the 
Developing Ideas conference for their invaluable feedback. And finally, thank you to Samuel 
Wilwerding and the editorial staff at the Alabama Law Review for their excellent editorial work.  
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his family, Mr. Scott owed over $18,000 in child support.1 He missed a 
court date related to his failure to pay the child support, and a warrant 
issued. His brother says he ran because he did not want to have to spend 
more time behind bars and face the loss of another job as a result of his 
failure to pay and the subsequent warrant.2 “Every job he has had, he has 
gotten fired from because he went to jail because he was locked up for 
child support. . . . He got to the point where he felt like it defeated the 
purpose.”3 
Subsequent to Mr. Scott’s death, the child support system stayed on the 
public radar for a short period of time.4 But the concerns about the system 
raised by Mr. Scott’s death have faded. Police departments have continued 
to make sweeps for “deadbeat” parents,5 and legislatures have pushed 
through new laws that further curtail the options available for a parent with 
outstanding child support obligations. Even nonlegislative agencies have 
promulgated punitive policies. For example, the Texas Attorney General 
recently implemented a new measure prohibiting a parent with a delinquent 
child support obligation from renewing his car registration.6 The ever-
present threat of criminal prosecution and incarceration looms large for 
parents who simply cannot afford to pay their outstanding child support 
obligations, trapping men of little or no means “in a cycle of debt, 
unemployment, and imprisonment.”7 
Increasing numbers of parents, primarily fathers, are prosecuted and 
incarcerated for failing to pay child support.8 Although national data is not 
 
1.  Frances Robles & Shaila Dewan, Skip Child Support. Go to Jail. Lose Job. Repeat., N.Y. 
TIMES (Apr. 19, 2015), https://www.nytimes.com/2015/04/20/us/skip-child-support-go-to-jail-lose-job-
repeat.html. 
2.  Id. 
3.  Id. 
4.  See, e.g., id.; Eli Hager, For Men in Prison, Child Support Becomes a Crushing Debt, WASH. 
POST (Oct. 18, 2015), https://www.washingtonpost.com/politics/for-men-in-prison-child-support-beco 
mes-a-crushing-debt/2015/10/18/e751a324-5bb7-11e5-b38e-06883aacba64_story.html?utm_term=.dda 
01d0cf936. 
5.  Joshua Sharpe, ‘Deadbeat’ Parents Arrested in DeKalb Sheriff’s Holiday Sweep, ATLANTA J.-
CONST. (Dec. 22, 2016), http://www.ajc.com/news/local/deadbeat-parents-arrested-dekalb-sheriff-
holiday-sweep/83l1xVHLYS4QLuDyVDZceK/. 
6.  Madlin Mekelburg, Texas to Tie Car Registration Renewal to Child Support, TEX. TRIB. (June 
14, 2016, 6:00 AM), www.texastribune.org/2016/06/14/child-support-evaders-vehicle-registration-rene 
wal. 
7.  Robles & Dewan, supra note 1. 
8.  Another, likely larger, group of people are incarcerated on other charges but have an out-
standing child support order. See, e.g., Child Support and Incarceration, NAT’L CONFERENCE OF STATE 
LEGISLATORS (June 6, 2018), http://www.ncsl.org/research/human-services/child-support-and-incarce 
ration.aspx. Some states do not currently allow parents to modify their child support obligations while 
incarcerated. See id.; U.S. DEP’T HEALTH & HUMAN SERVS., ADMIN. FOR CHILDREN & FAMILIES, 
OVERVIEW – FINAL RULE 2016 FLEXIBILITY, EFFICIENCY, AND MODERNIZATION IN CHILD SUPPORT 
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kept, at least one source asserts that about 50,000 people are incarcerated in 
the United States for this offense.9 Another study out of South Carolina 
found one in eight of those incarcerated in county jails were there for 
failure to pay.10 In Georgia, 3,500 parents were incarcerated for outstanding 
child support obligations in a single year.11 An estimated one-quarter of 
inmates in federal or state prison have an open child support case.12 
All states have civil mechanisms to enforce child support orders, but 
increasingly, states are relying on criminal sanctions to remedy a parent’s 
failure to pay child support. This situation is untenable for several reasons, 
two of which are discussed in more detail in this Article. First, poor fathers 
are being incarcerated for not having the money to support their children. 
These prosecutions not only violate the Constitution but also contravene 
the prohibition on debtors’ prisons. Poor fathers are being punished with 
incarceration for not having the money to support their children. 
Second, and even more troubling from an institutional perspective, 
fathers with little to no income are helping finance the government’s child 
support enforcement system. Federal law requires custodial parents who 
receive state assistance to assign their child support payments to the state.13 
Thus, any child support payment by the noncustodial parent will go straight 
to the government as reimbursement for the state assistance it has provided 
to the custodial parent. If the father does not pay the child support as 
ordered, even when the failure is due to insufficient income on which to 
live and pay the debt, the government punishes the fathers with criminal 
charges or possible incarceration for not reimbursing the cost of the state 
assistance. In other words, poor fathers are being criminally sanctioned and 
incarcerated for failing to finance the government’s welfare programs and 
child support system, despite their inability to do so. 
Legislators and courts provide two primary justifications for a system 
 
ENFORCEMENT PROGRAMS (2017), https://www.acf.hhs.gov/sites/default/files/programs/css/overview_ 
child_support_final_rule.pdf. 
9.  CARMEN SOLOMON-FEARS, ALISON M. SMITH & CARLA BERRY, CONG. RESEARCH SERV., 
R42389, CHILD SUPPORT ENFORCEMENT: INCARCERATION AS THE LAST RESORT PENALTY FOR 
NONPAYMENT OF SUPPORT 2 (2012). A 2005 report surveyed newspaper articles and other data sources, 
seeking to compile as much information as possible about this type of case. That survey documented 
large numbers of arrests in each state for failure to pay child support. REBECCA MAY & MARGUERITE 
ROULET, CTR. FOR FAMILY POLICY & PRACTICE, A LOOK AT ARRESTS OF LOW-INCOME FATHERS FOR 
CHILD SUPPORT NONPAYMENT: ENFORCEMENT, COURT AND PROGRAM PRACTICES (2005). 
10.  Child Support and Incarceration, NAT’L CONFERENCE OF STATE LEGISLATORS (June 6, 
2018), http://www.ncsl.org/research/human-services/child-support-and-incarceration.aspx; Robles & 
Dewan, supra note 1. 
11.  Robles & Dewan, supra note 1. 
12.  DANIEL R. MEYER & EMILY WARREN, CHILD SUPPORT ORDERS AND THE INCARCERATION 
OF NONCUSTODIAL PARENTS 2 (2011), https://pdfs.semanticscholar.org/c130/5f6e35f52013e576abbb7c 
9e363d66bc744e.pdf. 
13.  42 U.S.C. § 608(a)(3) (2012). 
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that prosecutes and incarcerates poor fathers who fail to pay a private debt 
owed to their child’s mother or a public debt owed to the government as 
reimbursement for state assistance: child welfare and state fiscal well-
being. The government desires to protect children by ensuring their basic 
needs are met, but it does not want to bear the financial costs of providing 
that support. A closer look at the current child support system, however, 
reveals that it does little to enhance a child’s well-being or the govern-
ment’s coffer. 
One of the most critical determinants of a child’s well-being is having a 
healthy relationship with both parents. Our current child support system 
actively discourages paternal contact by imposing unrealistic expectations 
on a father to pay child support he often cannot afford. Thus, the govern-
ment in essence pushes the father away from his child, punishing the father 
for having a child he is unable to financially support. Not only is a child’s 
welfare diminished under the current system, but the economics underlying 
the system are both inefficient and morally troubling. 
As already mentioned, a significant portion of the child support system 
is subsidized by the child support payments made by men of little or no 
means. Statistics show that the state spends significant resources to 
identify, pursue, and incarcerate fathers who have very little chance of ever 
being able to pay the amount of child support they owe. States also seem to 
ignore the reality that once a father is convicted and incarcerated, even if 
only for failing to pay a child support obligation, that conviction and period 
of incarceration substantially diminish the father’s ability to obtain a steady 
job with reliable income in the future. Prosecutions of so-called “deadbeat 
dads” decrease the odds that those fathers will be able to pay both the child 
support initially owed and the considerable arrearage and interest that have 
accumulated, and which continue to accumulate, on that initial debt. 
The Office of Child Support Enforcement (OCSE) trumpets its system 
as “cost-effective.”14 But the cost-effectiveness calculations are somewhat 
misleading. Broadly related data is lumped together in the OCSE’s analy-
sis, making it difficult to truly ascertain how much child support money is 
going from noncustodial parents to custodial parents, and how much is 
simply going to the government for “reimbursement.” A close look at the 
data suggests that the child support system is a cyclical system of federal 
subsidies and poor fathers’ child support payments going in and out of state 
coffers to provide financial backing for the system. Somewhere in the 
middle are the child and her custodial parent, who often benefit minimally, 
 
14.  See, e.g., OFFICE OF CHILD SUPPORT ENF’T, ADMIN. FOR CHILDREN & FAMILIES, CHILD 
SUPPORT 2016: MORE MONEY FOR FAMILIES (2017), https://www.acf.hhs.gov/sites/default/files/progra 
ms/css/2016_preliminary_report_infographic.pdf. 
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if at all, from the noncustodial parent’s payments. Additionally, because the 
OCSE does not supervise the prosecutorial arm of the child support 
enforcement system, the OCSE’s cost-effectiveness analysis does not 
include the sizable costs the states bear for the prosecution and/or incarcer-
ation of noncustodial parents. Available information establishes that most 
of the outstanding child support debt in this country is owed by poor fathers 
who are unlikely to ever be able to pay what they owe. In light of such 
data, it is hard to overcome the presumption that a system relying on the 
financial contributions of these men is poor policy, financial or otherwise. 
These troubling validations raise the question of how states can justify 
the prosecution and incarceration of fathers for failing to pay a child 
support debt. The only logical conclusion is that we are pursuing criminal 
sanctions to ensure that as a society we have vehemently communicated 
our moral condemnation of a father for bringing a child into this world who 
he is unable to financially support. We are punishing these fathers for their 
reproductive decisions, for having “irresponsible sex,” and for not living up 
to our societal expectation of fatherhood. Criminal charges communicate 
moral condemnation for these sexual choices and, if a parent is convicted, 
carry an unshakeable, lifelong stigma. The stigma associated with having a 
criminal conviction is a punishment that usually lasts much longer than the 
more palpable deprivations of incarceration and state supervision in the 
form of probation or parole. Being branded a “criminal” carries broad, 
indefinite, and quantifiable ramifications.15 For most, these life-long 
deprivations are every bit as real a part of the punishment as the technical 
sentence imposed by a judge in a criminal case.16 
Recent literature has recognized the increasingly problematic role that 
criminal justice fines, fees, and costs (also known as “legal financial 
obligations”) play in the criminal justice system.17 But most of the criminal 
law scholarship has focused on the criminal justice debt that occurs after a 
finding of guilt or sometimes after arrest.18 On the family-law side, exten-
 
 15.  See, e.g., Eric Rasmusen, Stigma and Self-Fulfilling Expectations of Criminality, 39 J.L. & 
ECON. 519 (1996); cf. John Bronsteen et al., Happiness and Punishment, 76 U. CHI. L. REV. 1037, 
1049–55 (2009) (discussing long-term effects of prison on well-being). 
16.  Cortney E. Lollar, What Is Criminal Restitution?, 100 IOWA L. REV. 93, 107–08 (2014). 
17.  See, e.g., Laura I. Appleman, Nickel and Dimed into Incarceration: Cash-Register Justice in 
the Criminal System, 57 B.C. L. REV. 1483 (2016); Wayne A. Logan & Ronald F. Wright, Mercenary 
Criminal Justice, 2014 U. ILL. L. REV. 1175 (2014); ALICIA BANNON ET AL., BRENNAN CTR. FOR 
JUSTICE, CRIMINAL JUSTICE DEBT: A BARRIER TO REENTRY (2010), http://www.brennancenter.org/sites 
/default/files/legacy/Fees%20and%20Fines%20FINAL.pdf; see also Beth A. Colgan, Reviving the 
Excessive Fines Clause, 102 CALIF. L. REV. 277 (2014); Lollar, supra note 16; Leah A. Plunkett, 
Captive Markets, 65 HASTINGS L.J. 57 (2013); cf. Tamar R. Birckhead, The New Peonage, 72 WASH. & 
LEE L. REV. 1595 (2015). 
18.  See sources cited supra note 17. 
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sive literature discusses child support obligations through various lenses,19 
but no family law scholar has approached the topic of child support 
obligations through a criminal law lens.20 Scholars such as Melissa Murray, 
Andrea Dennis, Shani King, and Tracey Meares have joined Dorothy 
Roberts in drawing attention to the overlap between criminal law and 
family law.21 However, the topic of how the criminal system approaches 
child support has largely evaded consideration.22 
In light of the large number of people incarcerated after a conviction 
for failing to pay child support, this failure to evaluate the criminalization 
of child support obligations seems a substantial oversight. This Article 
seeks to fill that gap. The child support system falls in the nexus between 
the increasing focus on legal financial obligations on the criminal-law side 
and the focus on the treatment of fathers in the context of child support on 
the family-law side. It challenges the justifications for criminalizing the 
failure to pay child support and analyzes the impetus and impacts of 
making the failure to pay a crime. This Article challenges both the current 
manifestation of our child support laws and the underlying theoretical 
structure in which these laws are anchored. Not only are the laws imple-
mented in a manner that disproportionately affects poor men, particularly 
poor men of color, but the very notion of criminalizing the failure to 
provide financially for one’s biological child is grounded in moral 
judgments about sexual behavior and antiquated, structurally flawed ideas 
about fatherhood that no longer resemble reality. 
Part I presents a brief overview of the child support system and 
provides information about the fathers largely affected by it. Part I also lays 
out how, contrary to popular belief, a small percentage of indigent fathers 
owe the bulk of the national child support debt. Part II identifies two 
particularly troubling aspects of the child support system. First, the manner 
in which our child support system operates violates the Fourteenth 
 
19.  See, e.g., Tonya L. Brito, Fathers Behind Bars: Rethinking Child Support Policy Toward 
Low-Income Noncustodial Fathers and Their Families, 15 J. GENDER, RACE & JUST. 617, 622–33 
(2012); Laurie S. Kohn, Money Can’t Buy You Love: Valuing Contributions by Nonresidential Fathers, 
81 BROOK. L. REV. 53, 63–64 (2015). 
20.  See Andrea L. Dennis, Criminal Law as Family Law, 33 GA. ST. U. L. REV. 285, 287–90, 
296–98 (2017). 
21.  Id. at 287–88, 297; see also Elizabeth D. Katz, Family Law as Criminal Law: The Forgotten 
Origins of Modern Family Laws and Courts, 86 U. CHI. L. REV. (forthcoming 2019) (draft available at 
https://ssrn.com/abstract=3168243); Melissa Murray, Strange Bedfellows: Criminal Law, Family Law, 
and the Legal Constructions of Intimate Life, 94 IOWA L. REV. 1253 (2009); Melissa Murray, The 
Space Between: The Cooperative Regulation of Criminal Law and Family Law, 44 FAM. L. Q. 227 
(2010); cf. Cynthia Godsoe, Redrawing the Boundaries of Relational Crime, 69 ALA. L. REV. 169, 178 
(2017) (challenging scholars’ assertions that family and criminal law have little overlap). 
22.  But see Katz, supra note 21 (discussing history of the criminalization of nonsupport 
obligations). 
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Amendment and our country’s prohibition on debtors’ prisons. Fathers of 
little or no means are prosecuted and incarcerated for being unable to pay a 
private debt to the mother of their child. Likewise, if the state provides 
“welfare benefits” to the custodial mother, the law requires the non-
custodial father to reimburse those benefits or face prosecution and incar-
ceration for that failure. Second, the system operates on the backs of poor 
fathers. The child support system purportedly aims to ensure the health and 
well-being of children while simultaneously protecting the financial health 
of the state. Upon closer inspection, however, the system does not seem to 
do either of these things particularly well. 
In light of these deficiencies, Part III addresses the question of why we 
would continue to utilize such a system. Part III concludes that states 
continue to criminally prosecute and incarcerate poor fathers for being 
unable to pay these debts because, as a society, we want to send a message 
of moral condemnation about fathers who have irresponsible sex and fail to 
live up to their roles as “providers.” Our society has chosen to punish poor 
men for their reproductive choices and for bringing a child into the world 
and not financially providing for her. Part IV proposes some changes to the 
current system to address the problems identified throughout the Article. 
I. A FUNDAMENTALLY FLAWED CHILD SUPPORT SYSTEM 
The majority of men who reach adolescence will become fathers.23 
“The most enduring historical definition of a father has been as bread-
winner”24 or “provider and protector,”25 with the emotional and nurturing 
role of fatherhood only recently beginning to take a stronger secondary 
role.26 Many men, particularly those with little income, feel a significant 
obligation to fulfill these roles for their children, whether they are ulti-
mately in a position to do so or not. The pressure some men feel to meet 
this expectation, especially when they know the expectation is one they are 
not financially or emotionally able to meet, can lead them to absent them-
selves from their children’s lives.27 
 
23.  NANCY E. DOWD, REDEFINING FATHERHOOD 22 (2000); Peter B. Gray, On Non-Dads (Or 
Childless Men): How often do men become fathers and why?, PSYCH. TODAY: THE EVOLVING FATHER 
(Nov. 7, 2013), https://www.psychologytoday.com/blog/the-evolving-father/201311/non-dads-or-childl 
ess-men. 
24.  DOWD, supra note 23, at 37. 
25.  Javiette VaShann Samuel, Breaking the Cycle of Absent Fathers: Highly Involved African-
American Nonresidential Fathers Describe Their Roles and Responsibilities Beyond Biological 
Paternity 10 (May 2002) (unpublished Ph.D. dissertation, University of Tennessee) (on file with 
author). 
26.  DOWD, supra note 23, at 33–38. 
27.  Cf. id. at 23–24. 
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Yet the law has done little to acknowledge and respond to the 
vulnerabilities unearthed by fatherhood. Our current child support system 
highlights this failure. From as far back as the 1700s, and carrying through 
to today, states enacted punitive laws requiring a child’s biological father to 
provide financial support for that child,28 regardless of whether the father is 
or can be physically or emotionally present in the child’s life. States 
enforce this requirement, especially when the custodial parent (usually the 
mother) receives state assistance, even if the noncustodial parent (usually 
the father) similarly makes little income. Child support laws place both 
“the burden and responsibility of poverty squarely on the backs of 
fathers.”29 These laws particularly affect fathers of color with low in-
comes.30 Under our current legal structure, those men who may have had a 
precarious financial status prior to fatherhood often find their financial 
exposure deepened by their transition into fatherhood. 
A. The Structure of the Child Support System 
Whether a parent is married determines much about that parent’s legal 
relationship with his or her child. When a child is born, if she is the child of 
dual-gender married parents, the law attributes paternity to the man married 
to the mother of the child.31 However, if the mother is unmarried, a state 
official usually comes to obtain a Voluntary Acknowledgment of Paternity 
(VAP) before the mother leaves the hospital with her child.32 The VAP is a 
signed affidavit from the mother (and father, if he is there) asserting the 
identity of the child’s father.33 This document is transmitted to the office of 
vital records and, if not rescinded within sixty days, becomes the final legal 
determination of paternity.34 
 
28.  Katz, supra note 21, at 13–21; Kohn, supra note 19, at 63–64. Elizabeth Katz has a rich 
discussion of the history of how nonsupport became criminalized. “[I]n the late nineteenth and early 
twentieth centuries, charity leaders saw existing approaches to enforcing men’s family support duties as 
inadequate and pushed for criminalization . . . . [R]eformers initiated a century-long effort to categorize 
family support duties in whatever manner [criminal or civil] promised the most advantageous 
combination of high coercion and reach with low process and cost.” Katz, supra note 21, at 9. 
29.  Daniel L. Hatcher, Forgotten Fathers, 93 B.U. L. REV. 897, 907 (2013). 
30.  Deborah Dinner, The Divorce Bargain: The Fathers’ Rights Movement and Family 
Inequalities, 102 VA. L. REV. 79, 147–51 (2016); Solangel Maldonado, Deadbeat or Deadbroke: 
Redefining Child Support for Poor Fathers, 39 U.C. DAVIS L. REV. 991 (2006). 
31.  See, e.g., Susan Frelich Appleton, Illegitimacy and Sex, Old and New, 20 AM. U. J. GENDER 
SOC. POL’Y & L. 347, 358 (2012); Katharine K. Baker, The DNA Default and its Discontents: 
Establishing Modern Parenthood, 96 B.U. L. REV. 2037, 2038 (2016). 
32.  42 U.S.C. § 666(a)(5)(C)(ii) (2012); Baker, supra note 31, at 2048–49. 
33.  Baker, supra note 31, at 2048–49. 
34.  42 U.S.C. § 666(a)(5)(D)(ii)(1); Baker, supra note 31, at 2049. This determination may be 
challenged later, but only on the grounds of fraud, duress, or material mistake of fact. 42 U.S.C. 
§ 666(a)(5)(D)(iii); Baker, supra note 31, at 2049. 
3 LOLLAR 125-181 (DO NOT DELETE) 10/17/2018  10:52 AM 
134 ALABAMA LAW REVIEW [Vol. 70:1:125 
Regardless of how paternity is established—by marriage, a VAP, or 
some other route35—the designation of legal fatherhood confers both rights 
and responsibilities.36 As a father, a man is entitled to have contact with his 
child, and in the event of a custody dispute, he has standing to request 
greater custody rights.37 However, an unmarried father has the burden of 
affirmatively asserting his paternal interest in the child in order to have a 
hearing on the matter.38 Once paternity is established, a father also incurs 
the responsibility for child support.39 If the father and mother remain 
together, these rights and responsibilities are divided up informally 
between the two parents within the parental relationship. In the event that 
the parents separate, the law often intervenes to determine the scope of 
these rights and responsibilities for each parent. 
When married parents split up, the legal mechanisms are relatively 
clear. The parents file for divorce, and generally as a part of that pro-
ceeding, judges make or accept determinations about child custody, 
visitation, and child support. For divorcing parents, child support orders 
usually are only one aspect of a court order put into place at the dissolution 
of a marriage. Often the divorcing parents decide on the custody, visitation, 
and support arrangements on their own, prior to appearing before the court, 
and the judge simply signs off on their agreement.40 Although the laws are 
technically gender neutral, statistics show that courts more often grant 
mothers sole physical custody or a substantial portion of the custody of a 
child and order noncustodial fathers to pay child support to the now-
custodial mother on behalf of the child.41 In 2016, four of every five 
custodial parents were mothers.42 Most states do not require courts to grant 
a visitation order to the noncustodial parent, generally the father, as a 
precondition to that parent’s obligation to pay child support.43 
The procedures are less clear when nonmarried parents split up. 
 
35.  Clare Huntington, Postmarital Family Law: A Legal Structure for Nonmarital Families, 67 
STAN. L. REV. 167, 203 (2015). 
36.  These rights and responsibilities are often more limited for nonmarried fathers than married 
ones, however. See, e.g., Appleton, supra note 31. 
37.  See Baker, supra note 31, at 2049. 
38.  Albertina Antognini, From Citizenship to Custody: Unwed Fathers Abroad and at Home, 36 
HARV. J.L. & GENDER 405, 416 (2013); Serena Mayeri, Foundling Fathers: (Non-)Marriage and 
Parental Rights in the Age of Equality, 125 YALE L.J. 2292, 2334 (2016). 
39.  A mother also receives these rights and responsibilities. 
40.  Robert H. Mnookin & Lewis Kornhauser, Bargaining in the Shadow of the Law: The Case of 
Divorce, 88 YALE L.J. 950, 951 (1979). 
41.  Huntington, supra note 35, at 181–83. 
42.  TIMOTHY GRALL, U.S. CENSUS BUREAU, P60-262, CUSTODIAL MOTHERS AND FATHERS AND 
THEIR CHILD SUPPORT: 2015, at 3 (2018), https://www.census.gov/content/dam/Census/library/publicat 
ions/2018/demo/P60-262.pdf. 
43.  Huntington, supra note 35, at 183. 
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Typically, similar to when married parents divorce, mothers in nonmarital 
relationships retain custody of the child. Although the noncustodial un-
married fathers could go to court to secure custody rights or visitation with 
their child, usually they do not.44 Custodial time is usually worked out 
between the parents informally.45 As a result, unmarried custodial mothers 
generally regulate the father’s access to their child, essentially becoming 
“gatekeepers” to the father’s ability to see and spend time with the child.46 
If the father maintains a good relationship with the mother, he is able to see 
his child; otherwise, he may be out of luck.47 Because visitation or custody 
is not a prerequisite or corequisite to a child support order, the fact that a 
father may not be able to access or claim his rights does not affect his 
obligation to pay child support. If a mother remarries, the biological 
father’s rights become more limited, as courts continue to privilege the 
marital relationship over biological fatherhood.48 
In the case of nonmarried parents, an informal system of custody, 
visitation, and support could be maintained indefinitely, but if the custodial 
parent sues for child support or requests “welfare” benefits from the state, 
such actions trigger state involvement.49 If a custodial parent sues for child 
support and provides sufficient evidence of need and paternity, either a 
court or an administrative agency will issue a child support order to the 
noncustodial parent. Upon issuance of the order, the state becomes the 
enforcement arm should the noncustodial parent fail to comply with the 
order. If paternity has not already been legally established, via a VAP or 
some other mechanism, federal law requires the custodial parent to assist 
the state in locating the noncustodial parent and establishing paternity.50 If 
a custodial parent fails to help the state establish legal paternity, the state 
can deny her child support altogether or deduct 25% or more of the 
payments she might otherwise receive.51 
However, when the custodial parent files for state assistance, as 
opposed to requesting child support, the law is a little more complicated. 
Federal welfare law requires custodial parents who receive state assistance 
 
44.  Baker, supra note 31, at 2049; Huntington, supra note 35, at 194. 
45.  Baker, supra note 31, at 2050. 
46.  Huntington, supra note 35, at 194–95. 
47.  Id. at 195. 
48.  Mayeri, supra note 38, at 2372, 2379–80. Mayeri discusses the racial and class dynamics that 
influenced, and continue to influence, how the law has developed on this point. Id. at 2377 (“[N]on-
marital fathers began their quest for rights burdened by deep-seated cultural images, inflected by race 
and class, branding them as derelicts and deadbeats.”). 
49.  Baker, supra note 31, at 2050. When that happens, some noncustodial unmarried parents then 
make a formal, legal claim for custody rights. Id. 
50.  See 42 U.S.C. § 608(a)(2) (2012); 45 C.F.R. § 302.31(b) (2017); cf. 45 C.F.R. § 302.17. 
51.  42 U.S.C. § 608(a)(2). 
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to identify and locate the noncustodial parent (and if paternity is not 
established, to actively assist the government in legally establishing pater-
nity52) and then to assign their right to collect child support payments from 
that noncustodial parent to the state.53 Even if the custodial parent has no 
interest in involving the noncustodial parent, federal law will not allow her 
to receive state welfare benefits without identifying the father of her child, 
establishing a child support order, and assigning any child support received 
over to the state. Under this system, the state and federal governments then 
retain any child support obligations paid by the noncustodial parent as 
reimbursement for the “welfare benefits” the state paid to the custodial 
parent.54 Thus, if a custodial parent receives state assistance, the govern-
ment will seek reimbursement of that state assistance from the noncustodial 
parent. As a result, the government is the beneficiary of many child support 
payments.55 
The law’s treatment of nonmarried, low-income parents has negative 
repercussions for both parents.56 For custodial parents—primarily 
mothers—receiving state assistance, the financial support they receive each 
month is unrelated to whether the noncustodial parent pays child support; 
their financial picture remains the same either way.57 Custodial parents 
receive the same amount of financial assistance from the government 
whether the noncustodial parent makes a child support payment or not, and 
any payment by the noncustodial parent goes straight to the government to 
pay it back.58 As such, custodial parents do not directly benefit when the 
other parent of their child is able to contribute financially. 
For a mother who does not receive state assistance, the act of suing for 
child support also can result in more limited financial contributions. Once a 
child support order is officially entered, the government can subject a 
father to prosecution and punishment, including incarceration, if he does 
not or cannot pay.59 Either of these sanctions decreases the odds that the 
mother will receive additional income from the father of her child. 
If a noncustodial father is prosecuted for failing to pay child support, 
he will have significant difficulty finding a stable, well-paying job due to 
 
52.  Id.; see also 45 C.F.R. § 302.31(b); cf. 45 C.F.R. § 302.17. 
53.  42 U.S.C. § 608(a)(3); 45 C.F.R. § 302.50; see also Brito, supra note 19, at 625; Tonya L. 
Brito, The Welfarization of Family Law, 48 U. KAN. L. REV. 229, 253 (2000). 
54.  42 U.S.C. § 608(a)(3); 42 U.S.C. § 657(a)(1); Brito, supra note 53, at 253. 
55.  Brito, supra note 53, at 253 n.108. 
56.  See generally JILL ELAINE HASDAY, FAMILY LAW REIMAGINED 195–220 (2014) (discussing 
the implications of the fact that “courts and lawmakers describing, explaining, enacting, and 
implementing family law systematically fail to consider the legal regulation of poor families”). 
57.  Brito, supra note 19, at 625. 
58.  Id. at 625–26. 
59.  See id. at 655. 
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having the conviction on his record. If he also is incarcerated due to his 
failure to pay child support, he will make little to no income during that 
period of incarceration, and when he is released, he will suffer the long-
term ramifications of having a gap in his employment record, in addition to 
the criminal conviction.60 
Child support debt continues to accrue while a father is incarcerated 
and, in most states, continues to collect interest as well.61 As a result, when 
the father is released, he will have greater debt and less likelihood of being 
able to pay it. Unlike most other debts, child support debt is not discharge-
able in bankruptcy.62 The consequence is that, like Walter Scott, a father 
convicted and incarcerated for failing to pay child support will likely cycle 
in and out of the criminal justice system over his lifetime, as the odds of 
him being able to pay that debt will only decrease with each conviction and 
period of incarceration. Obviously, this result is not beneficial for the 
father, the mother, or their child. 
Regardless of how the child support order comes to be, the amount of 
the order is determined based on a formula.63 In 1988, Congress imposed a 
requirement on states obliging them to set up child support guidelines.64 
Federal regulations establish minimum standards for such guidelines65 and 
require that each state use “specific descriptive and numeric criteria” to 
calculate the child support obligation.66 Each child support order must be 
“based on the noncustodial parent’s earnings, income, and other evidence 
of ability to pay.”67 This “other evidence” must include, “at a minimum,” 
the noncustodial parent’s assets, residence, employment and earnings 
history, job skills, educational attainment, literacy, age, health, criminal 
record and other employment barriers, and record of seeking work, as 
well as the local job market, the availability of employers willing to hire 
the noncustodial parent, prevailing earnings level in the local community, 
and other relevant background factors in the case.68 
 
60.  A noncustodial parent incarcerated under a civil regime will suffer the same consequences 
from incarceration but without the stigma of a criminal conviction on his record. 
61.  See ELAINE SORENSEN, LILIANA SOUSA & SIMON SCHANER, THE URBAN INST., ASSESSING 
CHILD SUPPORT ARREARS IN NINE LARGE STATES AND THE NATION 8 (2007), https://www.urban.org/si 
tes/default/files/publication/29736/1001242-Assessing-Child-Support-Arrears-in-Nine-Large-States-an 
d-the-Nation.PDF. 
62.  42 U.S.C. § 656(b) (2012). 
63.  See, e.g., MICH. COMP. LAWS ANN. § 552.605 (West 2005); NEV. REV. STAT. ANN. 
§ 125B.070 (LexisNexis 2010). 
64.  Family Support Act of 1988, Pub. L. No. 100-485, § 103(a), 102 Stat. 2343, 2346 (1988) 
(codified as amended at 42 U.S.C. § 667(a)–(b) (2012)). 
65.  45 C.F.R. § 302.56 (2017). 
66.  Id. § 302.56(c)(4). 
67.  Id. § 302.56(c)(1) (emphasis added). 
68.  Id. § 302.56(c)(1)(iii). 
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The regulation specifically provides that “incarceration may not be 
treated as voluntary unemployment in establishing or modifying support 
orders.”69 Federal law requires states to impose a rebuttable presumption 
that any child support order based on a state’s child support formula is “the 
correct amount of child support to be awarded,”70 although several courts 
have found the rebuttable presumption portion of the statute unconsti-
tutional.71 The law also requires mandatory restitution in the amount of the 
unpaid support obligation.72 
In many states, the child support formula compels consideration of 
“potential” income, rather than actual income, if the parent is currently 
unemployed or “underemployed.”73 Likewise, some child support guide-
lines require payment, albeit a minimal one, even if the parent has no 
income.74 Judges have little discretion to deviate from the guidelines; 
rather, they are instructed just to apply the formula. 
Any future adjustments to child support orders continue to rely on 
these same formulas.75 The law requires states to review the child support 
determination at least every three years.76 But a parent cannot deviate from 
the state-ordered obligation. If the parent’s income level changes, that 
parent can petition the court or administrative officer for a modification, 
but only in that circumstance. The law leaves no room for informal or 
variable arrangements, or modifications of child support orders in real time 
or retroactively;77 those permutations simply are not permitted. At least one 
federal court has recognized that 
the issuance of a support order by a Court does not establish beyond a 
reasonable doubt that the parent involved will have the ability to pay that 
obligation . . . . In many cases, the parent is not even before the Court to 
contest the order and his or her ability to make the payments is thus the 
result of an ex parte proceeding with little or no evidence presented on the 
issue.78 
 
69.  Id. § 302.56(c)(3). 
70.  42 U.S.C. § 667(b)(2) (2012); see also 45 C.F.R. § 302.56(f) (stating that the formula is “the 
correct amount of child support to be ordered”). 
71.  See, e.g., United States v. Pillor, 387 F. Supp. 2d 1053, 1056–57 (N.D. Cal. 2005); United 
States v. Morrow, 368 F. Supp. 2d 863, 865–66 (C.D. Ill. 2005); United States v. Grigsby, 85 F. Supp. 
2d 100, 107 (D.R.I. 2000). 
72.  Deadbeat Parents Punishment Act of 1998, Pub. L. No. 105-187, 112 Stat. 618 (codified at 
18 U.S.C. § 228(d) (2012)). 
73.  See, e.g., KY. REV. STAT. ANN. § 403.212(2)(a), (d) (LexisNexis 2010). 
74.  See, e.g., id.; KAN. CT. R.P., CHILD SUPPORT GUIDELINES app. II. 
75.  45 C.F.R. § 303.8(b)(4)(ii)(A) (2017). 
76.  Id. § 303.8(b)(1). 
77.  See 42 U.S.C. § 666(a)(9)(C) (2012). 
78.  United States v. Grigsby, 85 F. Supp. 2d 100, 107 (D.R.I. 2000). 
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This inflexible system may work effectively for fathers of means, but 
as will be discussed below, most of the fathers delinquent on their child 
support payments are not people of means. The resulting system sets up 
fathers with little to no income for a perpetual cycle of poverty, incarcer-
ation, and stigma. This system diminishes the odds of the fathers ever 
paying off their child support obligations and does little to improve the 
financial circumstances of either the custodial mothers or the children for 
whose benefit this system is purportedly in place. The government is 
arguably the only party benefitting from this current set up, as it can require 
these indigent fathers to reimburse it for some of the costs of its welfare 
system. But even the government likely will not benefit financially from 
this system, as it will be out the costs of prosecution and incarceration 
when these fathers inevitably cannot make the payments as ordered. 
B. Debunking the Myth of the “Deadbeat Dad” 
Predictably, with such a strict system, noncustodial parents often are 
unable to comply with their court-ordered child support obligations. Yet, 
the view of fathers who cannot provide for their children as “lazy,” “loath-
some,” “idle from choice,” and evasive of responsibility is pervasive and 
deep-seated.79 Rather than recognizing that many fathers do not choose to 
fail to support their children, many lawmakers and much of the public 
continue to presume that fathers who do not support their children are 
intentionally avoiding their main parental obligation—that of providing 
money for their children. Recent changes in the law’s approach to child 
support obligations rely on the assumption that large numbers of fathers 
attempt to skirt their obligations voluntarily. 
To be fair, this belief is not without some foundation. By 2010, the 
total amount of child support arrearage accumulated nationwide since the 
federal Office of Child Support Enforcement (OCSE) came into being in 
1975 exceeded $110 billion.80 Although 43.5% of custodial parents 
received the full amount of child support due in 2015, 30.7% received no 
 
79.  Our country has a long history of legally condemning a father’s failure to financially support 
his children. See, e.g., DOWD, supra note 23, at 31; AMY DRU STANLEY, FROM BONDAGE TO 
CONTRACT: WAGE LABOR, MARRIAGE, AND THE MARKET IN THE AGE OF SLAVE EMANCIPATION 102–
40 (1998); Drew D. Hansen, Note, The American Invention of Child Support: Dependency and 
Punishment in Early American Law, 108 YALE L.J. 1123, 1145, 1147 (1999); Kohn, supra note 19, at 
63–64; Angela Onwuachi-Willig, The Return of the Ring: Welfare Reform’s Marriage Cure as the 
Revival of Post-Bellum Control, 93 CALIF. L. REV. 1647, 1654, 1659–61 (2005). 
80.  JESSICA PEARSON, NANCY THOENNES & RASA KAUNELIS, CTR. FOR POLICY RESEARCH, 
DEBT COMPROMISE PROGRAMS: PROGRAM DESIGN & CHILD SUPPORT OUTCOMES IN FIVE LOCATIONS 
2 (2012); SORENSEN, SOUSA & SCHANER, supra note 61. 
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payment at all.81 In 2015, the year with the most recent available data, 
approximately $13.6 billion of child support obligations did not get paid.82 
The rate of nonpayment to custodial fathers was not statistically different 
from the rate of nonpayment to custodial mothers.83 The poverty rate of all 
custodial families in 2015 was 26.8%, nearly 10% higher than the national 
average, and the poverty rate for families with the mother as custodial 
parent was 29.2%.84 Factors indicative of whether a custodial parent will 
receive payments include the custodial parent’s age, level of education, 
race, and marital relationships. Those who are under thirty, have less than a 
high school education, have no contact with the noncustodial parent, or 
have never been married are the least likely to receive child support 
payments.85 Fathers who have never married are less likely to pay full child 
support than divorced fathers.86 
Yet, recent data and social science studies have shown that a small 
number of noncustodial parents owe most of the debt.87 A study of nine 
states showed that 11% of the noncustodial parents with a child support 
obligation owed 54% of the debt; each of the individuals included in that 
11% owed over $30,000 in child support.88 National levels mirror those 
nine states.89 
The general profile of the fathers who owe large amounts of child 
support debt does not match our stereotype of a well-funded father on the 
lam, trying to avoid financially helping a struggling mother who is raising 
their child and trying to make ends meet each month. About one-quarter of 
all noncustodial parents have incomes below the federal poverty level.90 
 
81.  GRALL, supra note 42, at 12. 
82.  More than 40% of the $33.7 billion in child support owed was not received by custodial 
parents; $20.1 billion was received, indicating that $13.6 billion was not. Id. 
83.  Id. at 6 tbl.2. 
84.  Id. at 8. 
85.  Id. at 12; TIMOTHY GRALL, U.S. CENSUS BUREAU, P60-255, NEW CUSTODIAL MOTHERS 
AND FATHERS AND THEIR CHILD SUPPORT: 2013, at 10–11 (2016), https://www.census.gov/content/da 
m/Census/library/publications/2016/demo/P60-255.pdf. 
86.  Huntington, supra note 35, at 190. 
87.  PEARSON, THOENNES & KAUNELIS, supra note 80, at 3; SORENSEN, SOUSA & SCHANER, 
supra note 61, at 1. 
88.  SORENSEN, SOUSA & SCHANER, supra note 61, at 1–2. By contrast, many of the other 
noncustodial parents subject to child support orders owed either no or relatively small amounts of child 
support debt. Id. at 2 (revealing that 15% of those with child support obligations in nine states owed no 
child support arrears at the time of the study, while another 16% owed less than $500). National levels 
revealed similar numbers. Id. 
89.  Id. at 2 (showing that, as of April 2006, 43% of the country’s child support arrears were 
owed by 10% of those with child support obligations, each owing $40,000 or more). 
90.  ELAINE SORENSEN, OFFICE OF CHILD SUPPORT ENF’T, THE STORY BEHIND THE NUMBERS: A 
GOOD INVESTMENT 2 (2016), https://www.acf.hhs.gov/sites/default/files/programs/css/sbtn_csp_is_a_ 
good_investment.pdf. In fact, Congress knew a substantial number of child support obligors fell below 
the poverty threshold when it passed PRWORA. Brito, supra note 19, at 632. 
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Almost 75% of parents owing large amounts of child support debt either 
had no reported income or reported incomes of $10,000 a year or less.91 
Many of their child support obligations have been in effect for at least ten 
years.92 The public’s general assumption seems to be that these parents 
have some type of unreported income or assets that they are simply 
withholding or failing to disclose to the courts in order to avoid paying. 
Although this undoubtedly happens on occasion, only a small percentage of 
parents who have an ability to pay child support do not pay.93 In at least 
one study, 93% of parents with child support obligations reporting income 
over $10,000 had paid child support in the past year, whereas only 57% of 
parents with no or low reported income made payments during that same 
time period.94 Approximately a quarter of parents who did not report con-
sistent annual income were either incarcerated or disabled,95 and 42% of 
them lacked a high school degree or GED.96 
Despite their minimal incomes, the majority of parents with no or low 
incomes pay something toward their outstanding support orders.97 Not 
surprisingly, however, when parents with no or low incomes who are in 
arrears on child support obligations make payments, they pay only small 
percentages of the amounts they owe.98 One significant factor as to why 
these fathers with low or no incomes pay so little is that they cannot afford 
to pay the monthly amounts they owe. Of those earning $10,000 or less a 
year at the time of the study, the median amount of their child support 
orders represented 83% of their reported incomes.99 A survey of ten states 
revealed that, for noncustodial parents with reported incomes below the 
poverty line, child support payments constituted 69% of their incomes.100 
Another study of five states found that noncustodial parents with reported 
incomes of $500 or less per month had child support obligations averaging 
over 100% of that income, and for those earning $500 to $1,000 per month, 
 
91.  PEARSON, THOENNES & KAUNELIS, supra note 80, at 3; SORENSEN, SOUSA & SCHANER, 
supra note 61, at 3. Only 20% of those owing child support who had no debt reported incomes this low. 
Id. 
92.  SORENSEN, SOUSA & SCHANER, supra note 61, at 3. 
93.  Id. at 5. 
94.  Id. at 3. 
95.  Id. at 5; see also KAREN GARDINER, MIKE FISHMAN, SAM ELKIN & ASAPH GLOSSER, THE 
LEWIN GRP., ENHANCING CHILD SUPPORT ENFORCEMENT EFFORTS THROUGH IMPROVED USE OF 
INFORMATION ON DEBTOR INCOME, at iv, 17 (2006), https://aspe.hhs.gov/system/files/pdf/74966/rep 
ort.pdf. 
96.  PEARSON, THOENNES & KAUNELIS, supra note 80, at 3. 
97.  SORENSEN, SOUSA & SCHANER, supra note 61, at 9. 
98.  Id. 
99.  Id. 
100.  PEARSON, THOENNES & KAUNELIS, supra note 80, at 3. 
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their support obligations ranged from 21% to 60% of their earnings.101 
In many states, child support debt is increased by interest assessed on 
that outstanding debt, a consequence of a 1986 change in federal law 
wherein Congress enacted legislation requiring a parent’s child support 
arrears to be considered a “judgment.”102 The amount of money owed in 
child support has increased dramatically since that time, as most states 
began accruing interest on child support obligations.103 Between 1987 and 
2005, states that charged interest often experienced a tenfold increase in the 
amount of outstanding child support debt.104 
As a result of all of these factors, “relatively little of these arrears are 
likely to be collected.”105 In fact, one recent study suggests that only 40% 
of child support debt is likely to be collected within the next ten years, 
despite the panoply of penalties, punishments, and other enforcement 
measures states have at their disposal.106 Parents with low reported incomes 
(under $10,000 annually) are expected to pay approximately 27% of their 
arrearages over the next ten years, while parents with no reported income 
are expected to pay only 16%.107 
The misconceptions about who owes the child support debt in this 
country inevitably continue to shape our legal and societal response to the 
issue. Legislators, prosecutors, and courts assume, despite all evidence to 
the contrary, that punishment is an effective method of deterring nonpay-
ment and incentivizing fathers with delinquent child support obligations to 
pay up. But if fathers do not have the money to do so, no threat of 
conviction and punishment is going to draw blood from that stone. The 
legal system’s failure to recognize who owes the child support debt has led 
to a troubling and unconstitutional system of child support enforcement. 
II. FAILURE TO PAY CHILD SUPPORT IS THE NEW DEBTORS’ PRISON 
If a noncustodial parent fails to pay the requisite child support as 
ordered, criminal prosecution is a tool in the arsenal of child support 
enforcement agencies in every state. Criminal prosecutions for failure to 
pay child support are supposed to be last-resort options, given the presence 
 
101.  Id. at 3–4. “Only at higher income levels exceeding $2,000 per month did monthly child 
support obligations comprise more realistic percentages of incomes, ranging from 8 to 21 percent.” Id. 
at 4. 
102.  SORENSEN, SOUSA & SCHANER, supra note 61, at 8. 
103.  Id. 
104.  Id. 
105.  Id. 
106.  Id. at 40. 
107.  Id. at 50. 
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of civil enforcement options also available in every state.108 However, 
given the increasing number of men incarcerated for failing to pay, this 
option of “last resort” appears to be one used with staggering regularity. 
Although incarceration for contempt is also a regularly utilized civil 
sanction for nonpayment, states are employing criminal prosecutions in an 
unsuccessful attempt to deter parents from nonpayment, and more success-
fully, to aggravate the punitive impact of such nonpayment on delinquent 
parents. 
The utilization of criminal prosecution as an enforcement tool has 
particularly troubling implications. The crime of failure to pay child 
support is unlike most other crimes at the state and federal level, as it is a 
crime based solely on one’s failure to pay a debt.109 Although incarcerating 
someone for failing to pay a debt would seem to violate our oft-touted 
rejection of debtors’ prisons, the Supreme Court has sanctioned laws 
permitting a person’s incarceration for failing to pay a child support debt, 
so long as there is sufficient evidence that the failure to pay was 
“willful.”110 In a series of cases, the Supreme Court has held that incar-
cerating someone who cannot afford to pay postconviction criminal fines 
or fees—who is not “willfully” failing to pay—is a violation of the Con-
stitution.111 
In criminal nonsupport cases, the Court has not established this same 
threshold. Under many state child support laws, judges are not required to 
determine whether a person alleged to be delinquent on child support 
payments has the ability to make those payments.112 Either the fact of a 
 
108.  The Social Services Amendments of 1974 provided federal jurisdiction for courts to hear 
civil enforcement actions against a noncustodial parent for child support. Pub. L. No. 93-647, § 460, 88 
Stat. 2337, 2358 (1975) (codified as amended at 42 U.S.C. § 660 (2012)). 
109.  The crime of willfully failing to pay one’s taxes, see 26 U.S.C. §§ 7201, 7203 (2012), is the 
only other crime of failure to pay of which this author is aware. This crime is more akin to a crime of 
fraud, as it generally involves some type of active misrepresentation or affirmative omission in a 
manner quite distinct from the issues in child support cases. Many states do incarcerate people for 
failing to pay traffic-related tickets or other citations, but I am referring to actual criminal offenses here. 
Likewise, those with a conviction are often incarcerated for failing to pay criminal justice fees or fines, 
but usually they are locked up pursuant to a revocation of probation or parole because their failure to 
pay is a violation of a condition of their probation or parole. Generally, those who fail to pay these 
criminal justice fees and fines are not charged with a new crime based solely on that failure to pay. 
110.  See Bearden v. Georgia, 461 U.S. 660, 668 (1983). 
111.  See id. at 668–69; Williams v. Illinois, 399 U.S. 235, 240–41 (1970) (holding that incarcera-
ting someone for involuntary nonpayment of a fine or court cost violates the Fourteenth Amendment’s 
Equal Protection Clause when the aggregate imprisonment exceeds the statutory maximum imprison-
ment for the crime); cf. Turner v. Rogers, 564 U.S. 431 (2011) (considering civil contempt sanctions for 
nonsupport); Hicks ex rel. Feiock v. Feiock, 485 U.S. 624 (1988) (addressing criminal contempt 
sanctions for nonsupport); Tate v. Short, 401 U.S. 395, 398 (1971) (holding that converting a fine-only 
punishment into a sentence of incarceration when someone is indigent violates the Equal Protection 
Clause). 
112.  See infra notes 136–37. 
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valid child support order or the noncustodial parent’s knowledge of such an 
order is sufficient evidence for a judge to find criminal liability. 
Although some may be troubled by the Supreme Court’s willingness to 
uphold the constitutionality of sanctioning someone for failing to pay a 
debt, regardless of ability to pay, the prosecution and incarceration of 
someone unable to pay that debt should be deeply troubling even to the 
Court, as it certainly appears to be a violation of the Equal Protection and 
Due Process Clauses and the spirit of the Court’s precedent in this area. 
The Court has been abundantly clear in case law that the “critical” due 
process issue is a defendant’s ability to pay. Before incarcerating someone 
for failing to pay child support pursuant to a civil or criminal contempt 
order, or for failing to pay any other type of criminal justice fine, the law 
requires the court to determine whether the defendant is able to pay that 
financial obligation.113 
Thus, despite consistent Supreme Court precedent, legislatures and 
courts seem to be skirting the Constitution based on the distinction that, in 
a child support case, the outstanding financial obligation is not a fine or fee, 
nor a contempt finding, but is the basis for the criminal charge itself. States 
are regularly prosecuting and incarcerating people for being unable to pay 
off private debts owed to the other parents of their children, or public debts 
owed to the state after the state fronted money for the support of their 
children. Each of these bases for criminal charges is deeply troubling and 
both should be found unconstitutional under the Fourteenth Amendment’s 
Equal Protection–Due Process analysis.114 
 
113.  See Turner, 564 U.S. at 447–48 (holding that the state must provide procedural safeguards 
to ensure that due process is not violated by incarcerating someone who is unable to pay); Feiock, 485 
U.S. at 637–38 (recognizing a defense of inability to pay in criminal contempt proceedings for failure to 
pay child support); Bearden, 461 U.S. at 668–69 (finding a violation the of Due Process Clause for the 
lower court not to inquire as to willfulness of failure to pay). 
114.  The Fourteenth Amendment is not the only constitutional provision violated by the current 
child support system. Although courts have not yet been persuaded by the Thirteenth Amendment 
argument and have failed to consider the Eighth Amendment argument, an argument that these con-
stitutional provisions also are violated by our current child support system has substantial merit. 
Because they are beyond the scope of this Article, the arguments are mentioned only briefly below. 
(1) Thirteenth Amendment: Requiring a person to pay a debt he cannot afford to pay is a violation of 
the Thirteenth Amendment’s prohibition against involuntary servitude and forced labor. See United 
States v. Ballek, 170 F.3d 871, 874 (9th Cir. 1999); Noah D. Zatz, A New Peonage?: Pay, Work, or Go 
to Jail in Contemporary Child Support Enforcement and Beyond, 39 SEATTLE U. L. REV. 927, 948–55 
(2016). At least one circuit court has acknowledged that “[i]mprisoning someone for failure to pay a 
debt can run afoul of the Thirteenth Amendment,” Ballek, 170 F.3d at 874, as the way out of the debt 
could only be through a person’s labor. However, that court ultimately concluded that “child-support 
awards fall within that narrow class of obligations that may be enforced by means of imprisonment 
without violating the constitutional prohibition against slavery.” Id. According to the Ninth Circuit, the 
parent–child relationship is “much more than the ordinary relationship between debtor and creditor,” 
and as such, the parent assumes a “moral obligation to provide the child with the necessities of life.” Id. 
In other words, forcing a parent to work in order to support his child is not a constitutional violation, 
whether the parent wanted that role or not. Despite this circuit court’s ruling on the issue, it is unclear 
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A. An Exception to the Legal Prohibition Against Debtors’ Prisons? 
Both the federal government and most states abolished debtors’ prisons 
by the 1870s.115 Yet, despite this prohibition, most states do not ban 
imprisonment for “noncommercial debt” stemming from criminal court 
involvement or a failure to pay child support.116 In other words, a single 
exception appears to justify permitting both types of criminal debts—legal 
financial obligations and child support obligations—to fall outside most 
state prohibitions on debtors’ prisons. This “exception” developed relative-
ly recently when, in the 1970s and 1980s, an increasing number of states 
passed statutes allowing for the incarceration of a person who failed to pay 
his criminal debt.117 The only limitation became the constitutional strictures 
 
why the parent–child relationship should be exceptional in this way. The court cites to the long history 
of the state using “coercive power” to enforce child support obligations, even stemming before the 
passage of the Thirteenth Amendment. Id. at 874 n.2, 875. But the fact that a practice is grounded in 
history does not compel the conclusion that it is constitutionally sound. (2) Eighth Amendment: 
Another compelling argument might be made under the Eighth Amendment’s Excessive Fines Clause. 
The Excessive Fines Clause “limits the government’s power to extract payments, whether in cash or in 
kind, ‘as punishment for some offense.’” Austin v. United States, 509 U.S. 602, 609–10 (1993) 
(emphasis omitted) (quoting Browning-Ferris Indus. of Vt., Inc. v. Kelco Disposal, Inc., 492 U.S. 257, 
265 (1989)). According to the Supreme Court, “fines” refer to payments made to the state as 
punishment for an offense. United States v. Bajakajian, 524 U.S. 321, 327 (1998). For noncustodial 
parents whose payments are going to reimburse the government for the state assistance it already has 
provided to the custodial parent, the payments are going to the state. Arguably, however, those 
payments are not punishment, placing them outside the category of fines contemplated by current 
Eighth Amendment jurisprudence. However, although the initial child support orders may not constitute 
fines, once a person has been charged with and convicted of the criminal offense of failing to pay child 
support, a strong argument can be made that the inevitable restitution order entered in the case—the one 
requiring the noncustodial parent defendant to pay the amount of child support owed pursuant to the 
restitution order in the criminal case to the government—violates the Eighth Amendment. See Lollar, 
supra note 16, at 148–49, 152–54 (arguing that criminal restitution orders are subject to the Eighth 
Amendment’s Excessive Fines Clause); supra note 72 and accompanying text. As previously discussed, 
the amount of child support ordered by a court or administrative officer in a given case is based on a 
formula which often is not the appropriate one to use for determining how much a noncustodial parent 
realistically can afford to pay in child support. If the child support order, as incorporated into the 
restitution order, is for an amount that the noncustodial parent realistically cannot pay, the parent has a 
compelling Excessive Fines Clause argument, as the criminal restitution order is for that same amount. 
Thus, if the initial order is beyond a parent’s ability to pay and that amount is incorporated into the 
criminal restitution order requiring the defendant to pay the state, this amount is excessive and a 
violation of the Eighth Amendment. Lollar, supra note 16, at 148–49, 152–54. 
115.  Birckhead, supra note 17, at 1628–29. 
116.  Appleman, supra note 17, at 1489–90; Birckhead, supra note 17, at 1629. This “non-
commercial debt” stands in contrast to private debt, such as that resulting from unpaid credit card debt, 
so-called “payday loans,” medical bills, and other debts owed to private companies. Birckhead, supra 
note 17, at 1626. Incarceration is still a possibility with private debt, as the creditor can sue the debtor in 
civil court to collect the debt, and if the court decides the debtor’s failure to pay is “willful,” or if the 
debtor fails to show otherwise, criminal contempt is a possible sanction. Id. Thus, private contractual 
debt also can subject someone to incarceration. Id. at 1629. 
117.  Birckhead, supra note 17, at 1629. 
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provided by the Supreme Court in a trio of cases culminating in Bearden v. 
Georgia.118 
In Bearden v. Georgia, the Supreme Court addressed whether a state 
could automatically revoke a person’s probation for failing to pay a fee or 
fine without any consideration of that person’s ability to pay.119 Although 
the parties argued the issue on equal protection grounds, the Court found 
that “[d]ue process and equal protection principles converge in the Court’s 
analysis.”120 As the Court articulated, 
one must determine whether, and under what circumstances, a defendant’s 
indigent status may be considered in the decision whether to revoke 
probation. This is substantially similar to asking directly the due process 
question of whether and when it is fundamentally unfair or arbitrary for 
the State to revoke probation when an indigent is unable to pay the 
fine. Whether analyzed in terms of equal protection or due process, the 
issue cannot be resolved by resort to easy slogans or pigeonhole analysis, 
but rather requires a careful inquiry into such factors as “the nature of the 
individual interest affected, the extent to which it is affected, the 
rationality of the connection between legislative means and purpose, [and] 
the existence of alternative means for effectuating the purpose.”121 
The Court found that “the reasons for nonpayment” were “of critical 
importance.”122 If a probationer willfully fails to pay a fine, restitution, or 
fee when he has the means to pay, imprisonment is a permissible sanc-
tion.123 Likewise, if a person has not made “bona fide efforts” to seek 
employment in order to pay off the criminal justice debt, imprisonment is 
justifiable.124 But if someone has made reasonable efforts to pay off the 
debt and simply is unable to do so, “it is fundamentally unfair” for courts 
not to consider “whether adequate alternative methods of punishing the 
defendant are available.”125 If the court has determined that a fine or resti-
tution is the “appropriate and adequate penalty for the crime,” it cannot 
then convert that sentence into a sentence of incarceration solely because 
the person does not have the ability to pay that fine or restitution.126 To do 
so is a violation of the Fourteenth Amendment.127 
In theory, Bearden should have significantly changed the criminal 
 
118.  Id. at 1629–33. 
119.  Bearden v. Georgia, 461 U.S. 660, 661 (1983). 
120.  Id. at 667. 
121.  Id. at 666–67 (alteration in original) (quoting Williams v. Illinois, 399 U.S. 235, 260 (1970) 
(Harlan, J., concurring)). 
122.  Id. at 668. 
123.  Id. 
124.  Id. 
125.  Id. at 668–69. 
126.  Id. at 667–68. 
127.  Id. at 673. 
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justice landscape. Yet, the number of people incarcerated for failing to 
fulfill their criminal justice obligations has exploded since Bearden. As of 
2015, approximately ten million people owed more than fifty billion dollars 
in criminal debt.128 Courts have come up with creative ways to technically 
comply with Bearden while simultaneously circumventing the spirit of the 
ruling. Some judges do not inform defendants of their right to have a 
hearing on their ability to pay outstanding criminal justice debt;129 other 
courts operate a “fines or time” sentence, requiring defendants to choose 
between immediately paying the criminal justice debt or serving time in 
jail.130 Some courts have implemented a system where a defendant agrees 
to pay the criminal justice debt as part of the plea agreement, making the 
failure to pay a violation of the plea agreement and skirting Bearden’s 
holding because Bearden himself went to trial.131 Still other courts have 
either directly flaunted Bearden or, at the very least, engaged in a broad 
interpretation of the term “willful.”132 State courts are in conflict as to 
whether the State or the defendant has the burden of proving whether the 
failure to pay was willful.133 
Although lower federal courts and some state courts have expansively 
interpreted the “willful failure-to-pay” standard,134 this standard has been 
accepted as the applicable standard in determining whether a convicted 
defendant should have his probation or parole violated for failing to pay his 
criminal justice debt. By contrast, the Supreme Court has not established a 
due process threshold for the crime of failing to pay a debt. Rather, the 
standards courts use in determining whether someone’s failure to pay their 
child support obligations should lead to incarceration are inconsistent, often 
failing to rise to the “willful” standard required for revocation. 
 
128.  Appleman, supra note 17, at 1485 & n.17. 
129.  Id. at 1490. 
130.  Id. 
131.  Id. at 1491. 
132.  OFF. JUDICIAL SERV., SUP. CT. OHIO, COLLECTION OF FINES AND COURT COSTS IN ADULT 
TRIAL COURTS (2014), http://www.supremecourt.ohio.gov/Publications/JCS/finesCourtCosts.pdf; 
Alexes Harris et al., Drawing Blood from Stones: Legal Debt and Social Inequality in the 
Contemporary United States, 115 AM. J. SOC. 1753, 1761 (2010) (“[W]arrants may be issued, and 
arrests and confinement may occur, solely due to nonpayment of legal debt.”); Ohio High Court Offers 
Judges Fines, Fees Guidance, AKRON BEACON J./OHIO.COM (Feb. 6, 2014, 9:16 AM) (on file with 
author); Editorial, Return of Debtors’ Prisons, N.Y. TIMES (July 13, 2012), http:// www.nytimes.com/ 
2012/07/14/opinion/ return-of-debtors-prisons.html; Editorial, The New Debtors’ Prisons, N.Y. TIMES 
(Apr. 5, 2009), http://www.nytimes.com/2009/04/06/opinion/06mon4.html; see also RACHEL L. 
MCLEAN & MICHAEL D. THOMPSON, COUNCIL OF STATE GOV’TS JUSTICE CTR., REPAYING DEBTS 
(2007), https://victimsofcrime.org/docs/default-source/restitution-toolkit/repaying_debts_full_report.pd 
f?sfvrsn=2; Harris et al., supra note 132, at 1782–83 (reporting that “nearly one in four of our 
respondents reported having served time in jail as a sanction for nonpayment”). 
133.  Birckhead, supra note 17, at 1634. 
134.  See, e.g., Appleman, supra note 17, at 1490–91. 
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An obvious distinction exists between the legal standard required for 
revoking a person’s probation or parole, or even pretrial release, after 
failure to pay a criminal justice obligation and the range of legal standards 
a state could set as the requisite mens rea for a criminal statute, such as for 
the “crime” of failing to pay child support. But what is required for incar-
ceration if one commits the “crime” of failure to pay child support is often 
much less than what is required for incarceration due to a failure to pay a 
criminal justice debt, an incongruous result. 
An examination of state statutes governing the crime of failing to pay 
child support reveals that states employ a range of mental states. Some 
states do require a “willful” failure to pay in order to justify a conviction,135 
but almost as many states have no mens rea requirement at all136 or require 
that the parent’s failure to pay be “knowing.”137 Both the strict liability 
standard and the “knowing” standard mean that a person can be convicted 
of failing to pay child support either without any consideration of the 
reasons for the person’s inability to pay, in violation of the spirit and 
arguably the law of Bearden, or according to a standard far short of what 
states require to incarcerate someone for a simple failure to pay a criminal 
fine, fee, or other sentencing sanction postconviction. 
To be clear, this author is not advocating for an approach that requires 
all states to analyze a noncustodial parent’s ability to pay and allows a 
finding of criminal guilt or incarceration only if the noncustodial parent’s 
inability to pay is found to be “willful.” Even if all courts authorized a 
criminal conviction only upon a finding of a “willful” failure to pay child 
support, this practice would still seem to be in open violation of the 
fundamental principle that courts regularly espouse: we are not a nation 
 
135.  CAL. PENAL CODE § 270 (West 2014); COLO. REV. STAT. ANN § 14-6-101 (West 2016); 
FLA. STAT. ANN. § 827.06 (West 2016); 750 ILL. COMP. STAT. ANN. 16/15 (West 2009); MD. CODE 
ANN., FAM. LAW § 10-203 (LexisNexis 2012); MISS. CODE ANN. § 97-5-3 (2014); N.J. STAT. ANN. 
§ 2C:24-5 (West 2015); N.C. GEN. STAT. § 14-322 (2017); N.D. CENT. CODE § 14-07-15 (2017); OKLA. 
STAT. ANN. tit. 21, § 853 (West 2015); 11 R.I. GEN. LAWS § 11-2-1.1 (2002 & Supp. 2017); VT. STAT. 
ANN. tit. 15, § 202 (2010); VA. CODE ANN. § 20-61 (2016); WASH. REV. CODE ANN § 26.20.035 (West 
2016); W. VA. CODE ANN. § 61-5-29 (LexisNexis 2014). Some states require the parent’s failure to be 
“intentional.” ALA. CODE § 13A-13-4 (2015); LA. STAT. ANN. § 14:75 (2018); NEB. REV. STAT. § 28-
706 (2016); S.D. CODIFIED LAWS § 25-7-16 (1999); WIS. STAT. ANN. § 948.22 (West 2005 & Supp. 
2017); WYO. STAT. ANN. § 20-3-101 (2017). 
136.  ARK. CODE ANN. § 5-26-401 (2013); CONN. GEN. STAT. ANN. § 53-304 (West 2012); IOWA 
CODE ANN. § 726.5 (West 2013); MICH. COMP. LAWS ANN. § 750.165 (West 2004 & Supp. 2018); N.M. 
STAT. ANN. § 30-6-2 (2004); S.C. CODE ANN. § 63-5-20 (2010) (“without just cause or excuse”); OR. 
REV. STAT. § 163.555 (2003) (“without lawful excuse”). 
137.  ALASKA STAT. § 11.51.120 (2016); IND. CODE ANN. § 35-46-1-5 (West 2012 & Supp. 
2017); KY. REV. STAT. ANN. § 530.050 (LexisNexis 2014); ME. REV. STAT. ANN. tit. 17-A, § 552 
(2006); MINN. STAT. ANN. § 609.375 (West 2018); MO. ANN. STAT. § 568.040 (West 2012 & Supp. 
2018); NEV. REV. STAT. ANN. § 201.020 (LexisNexis 2012); N.H. REV. STAT. ANN. § 639:4 (LexisNexis 
2015); TENN. CODE ANN. § 39-15-101 (2014); TEX. PENAL CODE ANN. § 25.05 (West 2011); UTAH 
CODE ANN. § 76-7-201 (LexisNexis 2017). 
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that incarcerates people for failing to pay their debts. But if the standard in 
Bearden were to apply to cases of criminal nonsupport and if courts did set 
“willfulness” as the requisite threshold, in light of how often courts manage 
to skirt their constitutional obligations under Bearden, the results likely 
would be no different in the context of the crime of nonsupport. “Willful-
ness” would be just a procedural hurdle to overcome through creative 
maneuvering or an expansive interpretation of what constitutes a “willful” 
failure to pay. 
B. Criminal Prosecution as a Sanction for Poor Fatherhood 
The creation of a new generation of fathers incarcerated in debtors’ 
prisons is only one troubling consequence of the law’s current approach to 
child support obligations. Another significant problem with the child sup-
port system is that it is funded on the backs of parents, primarily fathers, 
who are indigent and can barely support themselves. The system is set up 
so that fathers with little to no income are helping to finance the 
government’s child support enforcement system, due to the assignment of 
support payments that poor and working-class custodial parents are 
required to give. Thus, the government is seeking to collect child support 
debt owed by fathers with little to no income who cannot pay what they 
owe. If a father does not pay the debt, even when it is because he has 
insufficient income on which to live regardless of the debt, the government 
punishes him with criminal charges and likely incarceration, which often 
leads to greater debt. The result is both that the child support system will 
never be fully funded in a way that is beneficial for the custodial parent and 
child, and poor fathers end up criminally sanctioned solely for not being 
able to finance the government’s child support system. 
Legislators tout, and society accepts, two primary motivations for our 
current child support system: ensuring the health and well-being of children 
and doing so without requiring the government to provide that financial 
support, which is often pitched as protecting the government’s fiscal health 
and well-being.138 First, the state desires to protect children by ensuring 
their basic needs are met. A caretaker cannot purchase the basic necessities 
for a child without money, and the biological parents are the first place to 
which states look to provide those funds. Second, the state desires to 
protect its own fiscal well-being. The state does not want to bear the finan-
cial responsibility for raising children whose parents either cannot or will 
not provide for them financially. A closer examination of the federal child 
support law belies this two-fold purpose while simultaneously revealing 
 
138.  See, e.g., Kohn, supra note 19, at 67–68. 
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that neither aim is met by our current child support system. Children are 
not better off, and, as suggested earlier, the government is operating at a net 
loss. 
1. The Child Support System as Child-Protective 
Children are among the most vulnerable members of our society. An 
appeal to the legislative and public conscience to help protect children and 
ensure that they receive the most basic necessities is easy to make. Yet, 
despite the repeated assertions by legislators and policymakers that the 
child support system has a primary goal of protecting and supporting 
children, the on-the-ground reality is quite different. The factors that have 
been shown to make a significant difference in a child’s development and 
achievement are multifaceted. Although those factors do include income 
level, the evidence to date does not suggest that child support laws change 
the income equation in a way that positively affects a child’s well-being. 
Our current child support laws do not address or attempt to assist with all 
the other relevant factors of a child’s well-being. 
Among the most important determinants of a child’s development are a 
combination of family structure, income level, and parental education.139 
Each of these factors has a reverberating impact. Family structure plays a 
key role in a child’s development and well-being. Children raised by 
married parents have higher academic achievements; stay in school longer; 
are less likely to use illegal substances and have contact with the police; are 
less likely to have sex and bear children at an early age; have better 
physical and mental health outcomes as adults; and earn more as adults 
than children raised by either divorced parents140 or unmarried parents.141 
By contrast, children raised by unmarried parents are more likely to show 
negative behaviors, whether those parents are living together with the child 
or not.142 Importantly, the marital status of the parents plays a much larger 
role in determining the outcomes than whether the child is raised by a 
single parent or in a two-parent family.143 
Both income and parental education also play a significant role in a 
child’s development, as these two factors tend to be related to family 
structure.144 However, recent research suggests that income and parental 
 
139.  Huntington, supra note 35, at 196–202. 
140.  The data on outcomes for children of divorced parents is more nuanced than that for 
children of unmarried parents. See id. at 196 n.165. 
141.  Id. at 196–97. 
142.  Id. 
143.  Id. at 197. 
144.  Id. 
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education cannot account for all of the differences in outcomes between 
children of married and unmarried parents, even though these differences 
are significantly diminished when researchers control for poverty and 
parental resources.145 On closer examination, other factors related to family 
structure make the critical difference in outcomes. Specifically, family 
instability and a parent having a child by a new partner both play influential 
roles in child outcomes.146 
Long-established research determined that children need a secure base 
from which to learn about and explore the world around them. Secure 
relationships in early childhood positively affect brain development and 
academic achievement147 as well as behavior and emotional development. 
When the relationship between parents is unstable, the instability affects 
the parenting behavior of both parents, resulting in their child having more 
difficulty gaining the attention and attachment they need for healthy 
development.148 
In the event either parent ends up with a new partner, particularly if 
that parent and the new partner have a child together, that pairing again 
affects parenting. If the mother ends up with a new partner, the father’s 
involvement in his child’s life tends to diminish.149 If the mother has a child 
by a new partner, she often experiences increased financial strain and less 
support from her family and social network.150 If a father has a child by a 
new partner, numerous factors contribute to greater odds that he will disen-
gage from his previous children.151 This withdrawal regularly leads to 
increased academic, emotional, and behavioral problems for the children 
from his previous relationship(s).152 
Paternal disengagement is a problem for children of divorced parents as 
well as for those whose parents never married. Almost 60% of children of 
divorced or separated parents see their fathers a few times a year or less, 
and children from nonmarital relationships see their fathers even more 
rarely.153 Studies have found that a father’s absence doubles the likelihood 
of a child’s incarceration, even accounting for parental education, family 
income, race, and other factors.154 Absent fathers can lead a child to have 
 
145.  Id. at 197–98. 
146.  Id. at 198–202. 
147.  Id. at 198–99. 
148.  Id. at 199–200. 
149.  Id. 
150.  Id. at 200–01 
151.  Id. at 201. 
152.  Maldonado, supra note 30, at 998–99. 
153.  Solangel Maldonado, Recidivism and Paternal Engagement, 40 FAMILY L.Q. 191, 194 
(2006). 
154.  Id. at 194–95. 
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increased mental health issues, diminished levels of school achievement, 
disproportionate representation in the juvenile justice system, and greater 
risk of adolescent pregnancy.155 When fathers positively engage with their 
children, they can play important roles in the lives and successes of their 
children.156 Children who have regular contact with their fathers have better 
academic, social, and emotional outcomes.157 
On the surface, child support payments made by the noncustodial 
parent to the custodial parent should help address one factor that 
significantly impacts child well-being: income. Yet, as we know from the 
previous Part, the fathers who owe the most child support to the mothers 
who most need it are the ones with the least ability to pay it. As a result, 
child support orders have the presumably unintended result of leading to 
increased paternal disengagement. Although child support laws operate 
relatively effectively for divorcing parents, as most divorced custodial 
parents receive full or partial payment of child support obligations,158 for 
unmarried parents, child support often is “a source of tremendous acrimony 
and divisiveness.”159 Divorcing parents who are “elite, college-educated 
couples seek relatively egalitarian partnerships and negotiate under a 
default rule of shared parenting.”160 By contrast, 45% of unmarried fathers 
have dropped out of high school and 42% have been incarcerated at some 
point, both factors that decrease their ability to pay.161 
The result is that “stringent child support enforcement” discourages 
poor fathers from being involved in their child’s life.162 As one scholar has 
noted, “the system imposes unrealistic expectations, angering mothers, who 
are annoyed that fathers are not meeting their obligations, and fathers, who 
are frustrated by the onerous debt.”163 Rather than encouraging a father’s 
presence in his child’s life, child support enforcement pushes poor fathers 
away from their children.164 Child support laws reinforce a message that a 
father’s only worth to his child is financial: “[D]efining nonresident 
 
155.  ANNIE E. CASEY FOUND., A SHARED SENTENCE: THE DEVASTATING TOLL OF PARENTAL 
INCARCERATION ON KIDS, FAMILIES, AND COMMUNITIES 3 (2016); Kohn, supra note 19, at 85–86. 
156.  Kohn, supra note 19, at 86. 
157.  Maldonado, supra note 153, at 194. 
158.  Huntington, supra note 35, at 206. 
159.  Id. at 206–07; see also HASDAY, supra note 56, at 206–07 (“[Child support statutes] created 
reasons to stop paying child support . . . . The law conclusively presumed that support paid for one child 
would also be used to support that child’s co-resident full or half-siblings, even if those siblings were 
biologically unrelated and legally unconnected to the person paying the support. A noncustodial parent 
who did not want to support someone else’s children might be disinclined to keep paying support.”). 
160.  Mayeri, supra note 38, at 2296. 
161.  Huntington, supra note 35, at 206–07. 
162.  Mayeri, supra note 38, at 2296; see also Maldonado, supra note 30, at 1012. 
163.  Huntington, supra note 35, at 206. 
164.  Maldonado, supra note 30, at 1014. 
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fathers’ ‘responsibility solely in terms of cash support . . . [makes] it more 
difficult for [them] to offer inputs of time or emotional effort in their place, 
contributing to paternal disengagement.’”165 Not surprisingly, studies have 
found a correlation between the frequency of paternal contact and the 
payment of child support.166 
The relationship between children and their fathers becomes even more 
strained if they are incarcerated due to the failure to pay child support debt. 
Numerous studies document the myriad barriers children encounter in 
attempting to continue a relationship with an incarcerated parent. Many 
inmates are incarcerated at facilities far from home in locations largely 
inaccessible by public transportation.167 If a child is able to arrange a visit, 
most visits are regulated. Other studies detail the negative effects of a 
parent’s incarceration on a child’s well-being.168 “[A] study of fathers in 
prison” found “that almost 42% of [those] who [did] not live[] with their 
child[] prior to incarceration” only “had contact with their child[]” once a 
month or less while incarcerated.169 For children who want a relationship 
with their father, paternal interactions have a “significant positive emotion-
al impact.”170 
If the welfare of children was truly the concern, the child support 
system would be designed to encourage paternal involvement, not just 
paternal income. To encourage parental involvement, a child-centered 
support system would place a value on the very important nonmonetary 
contributions a noncustodial parent can, and often does, make in a child’s 
life.171 Laws and regulations would focus on helping those fathers who 
make below the poverty threshold attain job skills, education, and 
employment so they become better equipped to provide financial sup-
port.172 If the child support system were more flexible in looking at a 
noncustodial parent’s contributions and providing methods of helping that 
parent obtain stable work, these two factors could go far toward eliminating 
 
165.  Id. at 1013 (alteration in original) (citing Paula England & Nance Folbre, Involving Dads: 
Parental Bargaining and Family Well-Being, in HANDBOOK OF FATHER INVOLVEMENT 387, 402 
(Catherine S. Taims-LeMonda & Natasha Cabrera eds., 2002)). 
166.  Id. at 998. 
167.  Dennis, supra note 20, at 328. 
168.  Id. at 328–29; Kohn, supra note 19, at 77. 
169.  Kohn, supra note 19, at 77. 
170.  Id. at 85. 
171.  Id. at 53–54. 
172.  Brito, supra note 19, at 633; Maldonado, supra note 30, at 1019–20. Although programs 
aimed at increasing the amount of child support a father pays by helping them obtain job training and 
skills have not necessarily led to increases in employment rates or child support payments in the past, 
the failures have likely been linked to the program’s focus. Id. at 1019–21. These programs have still 
been aimed at collecting child support, not encouraging and facilitating paternal involvement. Id. at 
1021–22. 
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many of the barriers to paying child support. 
2. The Child Support System’s Fiscal Responsibility? 
In addition to the welfare of children, legislatures have long touted the 
government’s financial well-being as motivation for our current child 
support system’s setup. Legislators desire to keep state and local 
governments from having to support children whose custodial parent is 
unable to support herself and her children. As a result, legislatures require 
noncustodial parents to reimburse the state for any “welfare” expenditures 
it makes to the custodial parent. If a custodial parent does not receive state 
assistance, the noncustodial parent’s child support payment goes to the 
custodial parent. But if she does receive state assistance, the noncustodial 
parent’s payment goes directly to the state and federal governments, who 
subsidize the state child support systems, as reimbursement. Accessible 
data establishing what percentage of noncustodial parents’ payments go 
directly to the state and federal governments and what percentage is passed 
on to custodial parents is lacking.  
On the surface, a recent infographic from the Office of Child Support 
Enforcement (OCSE) seems to provide this data.173 According to that 
infographic, 95% of child support collected in fiscal year 2016 went 
directly to families, with 5% reimbursing public assistance dollars.174 
OCSE also highlights the cost-effectiveness of the child support program. 
According to the infographic, for every $1 spent on administering the child 
support program, $5.33 was collected.175  
On further examination, these statistics appear somewhat misleading. 
The way the data is presented makes it difficult to tell where a noncustodial 
parent’s money paid as “child support” is actually going. The most recent 
OCSE annual report suggests that only a very small percentage—less than 
5%—of child support and foster care payments is going to reimburse the 
state and federal government for the financial assistance they provide to 
those in need.176 On closer inspection, and with the caveats mentioned in 
 
173.  OFFICE OF CHILD SUPPORT ENF’T, 2016 CHILD SUPPORT: MORE MONEY FOR FAMILIES 
(2017), https://www.acf.hhs.gov/sites/default/files/programs/css/2016_preliminary_report_infographic. 
pdf. 
174.  Id. 
175.  Id. Data from fiscal year 2017 has a slightly lower cost-effectiveness ratio of $5.15. OFFICE 
OF CHILD SUPPORT ENF’T, PRELIMINARY REPORT FY 2017, at 6 tbl.P-1 (2018), https://www.acf.hhs.gov 
/sites/default/files/programs/css/fy_2017_preliminary_data_report.pdf. 
176.  OFFICE OF CHILD SUPPORT ENF’T, supra note 175, at 6 tbl.P-1 (dividing total assistance 
reimbursement from FY 2017—$1,184,766,692—by the payments made to families or foster care that 
passed through to families during the same year—$26,725,120,378); id. at 16 tbl.P-11 (noting total 
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previous paragraphs related to the difficulty of deciphering the data, the 
numbers suggest that 67% of collections disbursed on behalf of those 
children who are currently receiving child support assistance goes toward 
reimbursing the state and federal governments for the “welfare assistance” 
they have provided to those children.177 A much smaller percentage—8%—
of collections received and then disbursed on behalf of children who 
formerly received state assistance goes to reimburse the government,178 
thereby skewing the data, since these two categories are combined.179 
Approximately 55% of the collections goes to reimburse the federal 
government, and approximately 45% remains with the state.180 
The cost-effectiveness ratio is similarly problematic. The cost-
effectiveness ratio of $5.33 collected for every $1 spent is reached by 
dividing collections by expenditures.181 But how OCSE defines “collec-
 
distributed TANF collections of $1,348,334,734, which, according to an email to the author from 
OCSE, is the amount of reimbursement to the state and federal government). 
177.  Id. at 6 tbl.P-1 (dividing current assistance collections disbursed as assistance reimburse-
ment from FY 2017—$477,348,405—by the total current assistance collections disbursed from the 
same year—$710,521,048). The caveat is that foster care collections and payments are not separated 
out, except in one stand-alone table, see id. at 17 tbl.P-12, making it unclear what percentage of these 
payments may be reimbursing states and the federal government for foster care maintenance payments, 
see id. at 6 tbl.P-1 & n.3. Total foster care collections distributed amounted to $69,604,601. Id. at 17 
tbl.P-12. 
178.  Id. at 6 tbl.P-1 (dividing assistance reimbursement of former assistance collections by 
classification from FY 2017—$707,418,287—by the total former assistance collections from the same 
year—$8,614,626,411). 
179.  The much smaller percentage of collections on behalf of children who formerly received 
assistance goes toward arrearages and seems largely to be distributed directly to the custodial parents. 
Why is not abundantly clear. The data is additionally skewed because it includes Medicaid payments 
and other payments made to families who never received state assistance at all. See id. It is still unclear 
to this author, however, how the authors of the report arrive at the conclusion that 95% of payments go 
to families in light of the 67% and 8% figures in the data found elsewhere in the table. OCSE indicated 
that it calculated the 5% by dividing the total payments to families (which includes child support, 
Medicaid, foster care, and medical support payments)—$27,386,940,389—by the total distributed 
collections—$28,625,294,083—to arrive at the conclusion that 95% of distributed child support pay-
ments go to families. See id. at 8 tbl.P-3. But some significant portion of the money that is going to 
families is for Medicaid, medical support, and foster care, not as child support in the sense discussed in 
this Article. See id. Additionally, almost 40% of the amount going to custodial parents as child support 
is money where the government has not ever provided welfare assistance to the parent or child. Id. at 6 
tbl.P-1. 
180.  Id. (dividing state and federal shares by the amount of total assistance reimbursement from 
FY 2017). 
181.  Id. at 41 tbl.P-36 (noting in the sources section at the bottom of the page the formula used to 
calculate the cost-effectiveness ratio); see also U.S. DEP’T HEALTH & HUMAN SERVS., INSTRUCTIONS 
FOR COMPLETION OF FORM OCSE-34, CHILD SUPPORT ENFORCEMENT PROGRAM QUARTERLY 
COLLECTION REPORT 4 (2018), https://www.acf.hhs.gov/sites/default/files/programs/css/form_ocse_34 
_final_instructions.pdf; U.S. DEP’T HEALTH & HUMAN SERVS., INSTRUCTIONS FOR COMPLETION OF 
FORM OCSE-396, CHILD SUPPORT ENFORCEMENT PROGRAM QUARTERLY FINANCIAL REPORT 6–7 
(2018), https://www.acf.hhs.gov/sites/default/files/programs/css/form_ocse_396_final_instructions.pdf. 
The ratio here is the 2016 ratio in order to stay consistent with the aforementioned infographic. The 
2017 cost-effectiveness ratio is $5.15. OFFICE CHILD SUPPORT ENF’T, supra note 174, at 41 tbl.P-36. 
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tions” and “expenditures” is critical. The “collections” figure includes 
collections that go to reimburse states and the federal government for the 
amount they are spending on TANF and foster care benefits;182 in other 
words, part of the collection is simply going back to the states and federal 
government to fund the child support program, not to the custodial parents 
as one might suppose. As already indicated, 55% of child support payments 
received as reimbursement goes to the federal government. 
The “collections” figure also includes almost $11 billion received and 
distributed on behalf of children who are not receiving and have not 
received any state assistance.183 In other words, this $11 billion might have 
been paid without the state ever getting involved. Assumedly, many of 
these payments were made by middle- and upper-class parents with steady 
income to a similarly situated former spouse pursuant to divorce-related 
custody and support agreements. Many of these contributions are volun-
tarily made.184 As a result, at least some portion of these individuals does 
not benefit from the state-run child support program, as they may not need 
any involvement from the state to facilitate the making of these payments. 
The “collections” number is also somewhat misleading as it does not 
include money received from the federal government that states use to help 
pay for the child support system: “[t]he child support [system] is a federal 
matching grant program under which state and local governments must 
spend money in order to receive federal funding.”185 For every $1 a state 
spends, it receives $0.66 from the federal government.186 The federal 
government pays a substantial share of the states’ administrative expen-
 
182.  Part 1, line 8 of OCSE Form 34 adds up the total collections distributed in lines 7a through 
7f, which includes, in line 7b, “[c]ollections [d]istributed [a]s [a]ssistance [r]eimbursement.” OFFICE 
CHILD SUPPORT ENF’T, supra note 175, at 41 tbl.P-36 (noting in the sources section at the bottom of the 
page that part 1, line 8, is part of the numerator in the equation); U.S. DEP’T HEALTH & HUMAN SERVS., 
INSTRUCTIONS FOR COMPLETION OF FORM OCSE-34, supra note 181, at 9–10. 
183.  OFFICE OF CHILD SUPPORT ENF’T, supra note 175, at 6 tbl.P-1 (noting $10,932,255,293 of 
distributed collections in the category of “never assistance,” defined as indicated); id. at 41 tbl.P-36 
(indicating sources for collections numerator at the bottom of the page); U.S. DEP’T HEALTH & HUMAN 
SERVS., INSTRUCTIONS FOR COMPLETION OF FORM OCSE-34, supra note 181, at 4 (giving definition of 
“never assistance”). 
184.  See, e.g., U.S. DEP’T HEALTH & HUMAN SERVS., INSTRUCTIONS FOR COMPLETION OF 
FORM OCSE-157: THE CHILD SUPPORT ENFORCEMENT ANNUAL DATA REPORT 20 (2016), 
https://www.acf.hhs.gov/sites/default/files/ocse/omb_0970_0177_instructions.pdf (noting in instruction 
for line 25 that “[v]oluntary payments are considered current support and must be reported here, even 
though there is no order to require payment”). 
185.  Elaine Sorensen & Melody Morales, Child Support Funding: 2008–2016, OFFICE OF CHILD 
SUPPORT ENF’T (May 2, 2017), https://www.acf.hhs.gov/css/ocsedatablog/2017/05/child-support-pro 
gram-funding-2008-2016. 
186.  Id. 
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ditures—approximately $3.5 billion annually.187 But the money that the 
state collects from the federal government is not included in the “collec-
tions” part of the equation; the term only accounts for money collected 
from noncustodial parents. 
The federal government operates an incentive system. Under Title IV-
D of the Social Security Act, states can retain a portion of their child 
support collections (rather than returning them to the federal government) 
based on their performance in five areas: “establishment of paternit[y], 
establishment of child support orders, collections on current child support 
due, collection[s] on past child support due . . . and cost effectiveness.”188 
An annual determination is made based on each state’s performance in 
these areas.189 
Both states’ expenditures and the federal government’s expenditures 
are included in the “expenditure” denominator of the cost-effectiveness 
ratio.190 The total “expenditures” in the ratio include funds the federal 
government provides directly to the states through this incentive-based 
program,191 even though the “collections” part of the ratio does not also 
factor in those payments. For FY 2016 and 2017, only “estimated” incen-
tive payments are documented; for the three previous years—FY 2013 
through FY 2015—the actual amount of the incentive payments the federal 
government made to the states is available.192 In FY 2017, the estimated 
federal incentive payments totaled more than $490 million, with the 
amount per state ranging from $0 in Hawaii, Nevada, District of Columbia, 
and Puerto Rico to $72 million provided in Texas.193 In the most recent 
 
187.  OFFICE OF CHILD SUPPORT ENF’T, supra note 175, at 48–50 tbls.P-43, P-44, P-45; U.S. 
DEP’T HEALTH & HUMAN SERVS., INSTRUCTIONS FOR COMPLETION OF FORM OCSE-396, supra note 
181, at 2 (definitions section). 
188.  U.S. DEP’T HEALTH & HUMAN SERVS., REPORT TO THE H. COMM. ON WAYS AND MEANS 
AND THE S. COMM. ON FINANCE (1997), https://www.acf.hhs.gov/css/resource/child-support-incentive-
funding. 
189.  OFFICE OF CHILD SUPPORT ENF’T, supra note 175, app. at 120–26 (laying out the formulas 
for how incentive payments are determined). 
190.  Id. at 41 tbl.P-36 (noting the sources used in calculating the cost-effectiveness ratio, which 
only include line 7, columns A & C from OCSE form 396, which are the total expenditures); U.S. 
DEP’T HEALTH & HUMAN SERVS., INSTRUCTIONS FOR COMPLETION OF FORM OCSE-396, supra note 
181, at 4–7. 
191.  OFFICE OF CHILD SUPPORT ENF’T, supra note 175, at 41 tbl.P-36 (noting in the sources 
section at the bottom of the page that line 7 of OCSE Form 396 is the primary source of the 
denominator, which includes federal incentive payments); U.S. DEP’T HEALTH & HUMAN SERVS., 
INSTRUCTIONS FOR COMPLETION OF FORM OCSE-396, supra note 181, at 4–7. The expenditures 
denominator includes “IV-D Administrative Expenditures Made Using Funds Received as Incentive 
Payments.” Id. at 4. As OCSE’s instructions accompanying the form note, this category includes 
“[a]dministrative expenditures and estimates using incentive payment funds. Each State is required to 
spend the funds it received as annual incentive payments to carry out title IV-D program activities.” Id. 
192.  OFFICE OF CHILD SUPPORT ENF’T, supra note 175, at 42–43 tbl.P-37, tbl.P-38. 
193.  Id. at 42 tbl.P-37. 
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years, the federal government provided more money than anticipated in the 
estimates.194 In 2013, for example, the estimated incentive payments 
amounted to about $448 million, but the actual payments totaled $538 
million.195 In FY 2015, the most recent year of available data, states 
anticipated receiving a little over $481 million in federal incentive 
payments, but actually received $556 million.196 As a result, one has reason 
to believe that the actual incentive payments made in FY 2017 will be 
substantially above the $492 million anticipated for that year. 
As it stands, much of the child support system is circular, with the 
federal government providing funding, via the states, to poor custodial 
parents on behalf of their children, and poor noncustodial parents being 
ordered to reimburse the state and federal governments for those programs. 
If the custodial parents are unable to do so, the government then seeks to 
punish and possibly incarcerate them. That hardly seems to be a cost-
efficient program, nor does it appear to be an effective one. The cost-
effectiveness ratio would be quite different if one removed the federal 
government’s substantial support from the equation and if one accounted 
specifically for the money that went directly to the custodial parents raising 
the children at issue. As it is, the cost-effectiveness ratio appears skewed. 
The ratio does not seem to adequately reflect either how much the state and 
federal governments are spending on the system or how much is actually 
going to the custodial parent rather than to the government to offset the 
costs of the state assistance it is providing. 
Additionally, the cost of incarceration for those who are punished with 
jail or prison time for failing to pay is one extraordinary cost to states that 
is not accounted for in the cost-effectiveness ratio. The average annual cost 
of incarcerating someone in the federal system is $31,977.65.197 As with 
the amount spent on maintaining the child support system, the amount 
states spend on incarceration varies widely. The average state cost nation-
wide is $33,274 annually, with “a low of $14,780 in Alabama” and “a high 
of $69,355 in New York.”198 California, at the high end, spends more than 
$8 billion per year on prison costs, whereas North Dakota, at the low end, 
 
194.  Compare id., with id. at 43 tbl.P-38. 
195.  Compare id. at 42 tbl.P-37, with id. at 43 tbl.P-38. 
196.  Compare id. at 42 tbl.P-37, with id. at 43 tbl.P-38. 
197.  Annual Determination of Average Cost of Incarceration, 81 Fed. Reg. 46,957 (July 19, 
2016). Those who have interstate child support orders can be charged federally now. 
198.  VERA INST. FOR JUSTICE, PRISON SPENDING IN 2015 (2017), https://www.vera.org/publ 
ications/price-of-prisons-2015-state-spending-trends/price-of-prisons-2015-state-spending-trends/price-
of-prisons-2015-state-spending-trends-prison-spending. Eight states, primarily northeastern, had an 
annual average cost of more than $50,000 per inmate, whereas eighteen states, primarily southern, spent 
less than $25,000 a year. Id. Nineteen states averaged between $25,000 and $50,000 annually. Id. 
3 LOLLAR 125-181 (DO NOT DELETE) 10/17/2018  10:52 AM 
2018] Criminalizing (Poor) Fatherhood 159 
spends $65 million.199 Obviously, these costs cover the incarceration of 
many individuals who are not detained on the basis of their failure to pay 
child support, but they include the approximately 25% of individuals 
incarcerated who have outstanding child support obligations at the time of 
their incarceration.200 Because accurate numbers regarding how many 
individuals are incarcerated solely for failing to pay child support are not 
available, assessing how much the average cost-effectiveness of the child 
support system would be, factoring in the annual costs of incarceration for 
those individuals, is impossible.201 
Legislators are no doubt sincere when they indicate a concern about the 
state having to support children whose parents are unable to do so. Notable 
scholars have documented this push toward privatizing family support.202 
But requiring men who make little or no income to subsidize the 
government’s child support program—and face criminal charges and incar-
ceration if they cannot do so—does not provide a cost-efficient or effective 
method for minimizing the government’s costs. 
III. CRIMINALIZING POOR FATHERHOOD 
If the child support system fails to effectively enhance children’s well-
being and fails to do so in a cost-effective manner, what is the motivation 
for maintaining such a system? Why criminally sanction and incarcerate a 
man who makes little to no income for not being able to pay either a private 
or public debt? Our society seeks to deter “irresponsible sex” among 
heterosexuals who cannot afford to support children and to punish those 
who failed to be deterred. Moral condemnation of and a desire to stigmatize 
poor, and often minority, fathers for making that reproductive choice to 
bear children they cannot financially support is at the heart of the 
criminalization of a father’s failure to pay child support. Although mothers 
are not immune, legally or otherwise, from this moral judgment and 
condemnation, the stigmatization of mothers manifests largely in other 
 
199.  Id. 
200.  See supra note 8. 
201.  Unfortunately, neither the federal nor state criminal justice systems seem to have informa-
tion readily available regarding the cost-effectiveness of their prisons and jails, as many are just starting 
to gather the necessary data to conduct such analysis. See, e.g., CHRISTIAN HENRICHSON & JOSHUA 
RINALDI, VERA INST. OF JUSTICE, COST–BENEFIT ANALYSIS AND JUSTICE POLICY TOOLKIT 2, 4 (2014); 
U.S. GOV’T ACCOUNTABILITY OFFICE, GAO-08-8, COST OF PRISONS: BUREAU OF PRISONS NEEDS 
BETTER DATA TO ASSESS ALTERNATIVES FOR ACQUIRING LOW AND MINIMUM SECURITY FACILITIES 
10–18 (2007). 
202.  See, e.g., Appleton, supra note 31, at 360–64; Laura A. Rosenbury, Federal Visions of 
Private Family Support, 67 VAND. L. REV. 1835, 1866–69 (2014). See generally MARTHA ALBERTSON 
FINEMAN, THE AUTONOMY MYTH (2004). 
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ways, some of which have been critically explored by distinguished 
scholars.203 The child support system is a primary area where this disdain 
of poor fathers is evident.204 Fatherhood is largely defined by a societal 
expectation of financial support—by an image of the father as “bread-
winner.” If a father fails to live up to that expectation, our society punishes 
him for bringing a child into the world and being unable to financially 
support her. 
A. The Use of Criminal Enforcement Mechanisms 
In examining how we have come to rely on criminal law to address a 
father’s failure to pay his outstanding child support debt, whether owed to 
the child’s mother or to the state as reimbursement, one has to wonder why 
we do not simply use the civil law mechanisms that are available to address 
this dilemma. After all, the civil system usually is where parties litigate 
financial obligations, liabilities, and debts, generally without resort to 
incarceration.205 This is not to suggest that this author finds incarceration 
pursuant to a civil contempt remedy a satisfactory mechanism for addres-
sing the needs of families with little to no income, but rather, to raise the 
question of why an additional layer of criminal processes is utilized at all 
when civil processes with similar sanctions are available. By invoking the 
criminal justice system, the state implicates an entirely different set of 
norms and emphases and raises a distinct set of questions, as will be 
discussed further below. 
All states have civil enforcement mechanisms that they can and do use 
to encourage noncustodial parents to pay. No available data suggests that 
civil methods of enforcing child support obligations are any less effective 
than criminal mechanisms at protecting state coffers and looking after the 
well-being of a child. Perhaps if evidence showed that the use of criminal 
 
203.  See, e.g., KHIARA M. BRIDGES, REPRODUCING RACE: AN ETHNOGRAPHY OF PREGNANCY 
AS A SITE OF RACIALIZATION (2011); DOROTHY ROBERTS, KILLING THE BLACK BODY: RACE, 
REPRODUCTION, AND THE MEANING OF LIBERTY (1997) [hereinafter ROBERTS, KILLING THE BLACK 
BODY]; DOROTHY ROBERTS, SHATTERED BONDS: THE COLOR OF CHILD WELFARE (2002) [hereinafter 
ROBERTS, SHATTERED BONDS]; Michele Goodwin, Prosecuting the Womb, 76 GEO. WASH. L. REV. 
1657 (2008); Dorothy E. Roberts, Unshackling Black Motherhood, 95 MICH. L. REV. 938 (1997). 
204.  Other noteworthy scholars have explored additional manifestations of this judgment. See, 
e.g., Antognini, supra note 38; Maldonado, supra note 30; Mayeri, supra note 38. 
205.  The obvious exceptions here are detention pursuant to a civil contempt order or through 
nominally civil commitment. Although civil law allows for incarceration through civil contempt, its 
regular use in the child support context seems to be merely an end-run around providing the legal 
protections required before incarceration is permitted in the criminal context. See, e.g., Scott v. Illinois, 
440 U.S. 367, 373–74 (1979); Argersinger v. Hamlin, 407 U.S. 25, 36–37 (1972) (holding right to 
counsel required before someone could be imprisoned for an offense); cf. Kohn, supra note 19, at 70–
72. 
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sanctions produced increased numbers of people paying child support obli-
gations, the argument that states use criminal sanctions because they are 
more effective might be compelling. But because states and the federal 
government do not collect data documenting the effectiveness of either 
civil or criminal enforcement mechanisms in getting delinquent parents to 
pay,206 we have no evidence that subjecting a father who does not pay his 
child support obligations to the strictures of the criminal justice system is 
either effective as a general matter or more effective than the use of civil 
sanctions.207 
In fact, the opposite appears to be true. Incarceration is a sanction 
available through civil contempt proceedings.208 However, if a parent is 
charged with the crime of failure to pay and the parent is deemed indigent, 
in most instances the state must provide counsel for the parent at an 
additional cost to the state.209 If the state brings a civil contempt action 
against the parent, no lawyer—and no additional cost—is required. 210 
If criminal law is no more effective than civil law at getting fathers to 
pay their child support obligations, and if incarceration is available as a 
civil sanction with no additional cost for a lawyer, what is it that the 
criminal law provides to make it a worthwhile option for states? Criminal 
charges communicate a message of deterrence regarding unprotected 
heterosexual sex and moral condemnation for those who disregard that 
message. Regarding fathers, we signal quite clearly our moral condem-
nation of men who engage in unprotected sex, father a child, and then are 
unable to provide financially for that child.211 Criminalization allows us to 
 
206.  The Office of Child Support Enforcement documents how much is paid, how many people 
owe, and many other aspects of child support payments, see supra note 175, but this author has not 
found any source documenting to what degree and how often, and in what amounts, civil or criminal 
enforcement mechanisms lead noncustodial parents to pay when they previously did not. Likewise, she 
could find no data comparing the relative effectiveness of the two sanctions. 
207.  As previously mentioned, there is simply a lack of data on the number of people 
incarcerated for failure to pay child support, both on the civil and criminal sides. As a result, we 
likewise have no information about whether incarceration pursuant to civil contempt orders is effective 
in getting noncustodial parents to pay. 
208.  In at least one state, child support obligors incarcerated pursuant to civil contempt 
proceedings constitute between 13% and 16% of the jail population. Brito, supra note 19, at 618. 
Notably, however, when states seek to enforce child support obligations through the civil contempt 
system, the owing parent does not have the right to counsel, see Turner v. Rogers, 564 U.S. 431, 448–
49 (2011), and the period of confinement is not limited by statute as it is on the criminal side. 
209.  In the states where failure to pay is a felony charge, indigent defendants always have the 
right to appointed counsel. See Argersinger, 407 U.S. at 37; Gideon v. Wainwright, 372 U.S. 335, 342–
45 (1963); cf. Alabama v. Shelton, 535 U.S. 654, 674 (2002). Although those facing misdemeanor 
charges only have the right to counsel if the judge is going to impose a period of incarceration, as a 
matter of course in most places, courts appoint counsel in misdemeanor cases as well. 
210.  See Turner, 564 U.S. at 448–49. 
211.  See Harry D. Krause, Child Support Reassessed: Limits of Private Responsibility and the 
Public Interest, 24 FAM. L.Q. 1, 17 (1990). 
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mark poor fathers with the stigma of a criminal conviction for engaging in 
this behavior. 
Deterrence is one of the primary theories on which criminal law relies 
to justify punishment—both general deterrence and specific deterrence. 
Although not usually acknowledged as a motivation for criminalizing the 
nonpayment of a child support obligation, deterring people with little to no 
income from engaging in (unprotected) heterosexual sex is an under-
acknowledged driver of our current child support system. Legislators and 
judges seek to deter what they view as “irresponsible sex,” even if such sex 
is engaged in by two people who are in a committed relationship at the 
time, by regulating the consequences of unprotected sex among those with 
little to no income. Criminalizing the failure to pay child support aims to 
deter unmarried straight individuals with little income from having children 
by making the financial, liberty, and stigma costs of such conduct suffi-
ciently high that potential parents will be dissuaded from engaging in the 
conduct altogether. 
To be clear, this focus on deterrence is aimed at fathers who have little 
or no income, as lawmakers seem to presume that fathers with steady jobs 
and comfortable assets will more securely assume the risk of their sexual 
activity and the possible financial obligation of supporting a child that 
might come from such a risk. This “bifurcation between the legal treatment 
of poor families and other families”212 is not unique to the child support 
context.213 Although “[c]ourts and legislatures regulating the rights and 
responsibilities of family members generally stress the government’s 
interests in protecting familial privacy, deferring to parental judgment, and 
reducing disruption of family relationships[,] . . . legal authorities embrace 
diametrically opposed norms in regulating poor families.”214 Jill Hasday 
observes, “Family law for the poor is explicitly premised on scrutiny of 
family life, suspicion of parental judgment, and enthusiastic interference in 
family relations.”215 Regulation and interference in the lives of parents of 
lesser economic means is not limited to the civil or family law context. In 
fact, as numerous scholars have observed, legislators and courts regularly 
 
212.  HASDAY, supra note 56, at 198. 
213.  See, e.g., BRIDGES, supra note 203; ROBERTS, KILLING THE BLACK BODY, supra note 203; 
ROBERTS, SHATTERED BONDS, supra note 203; Wendy Bach, The Hyperregulatory State: Women, 
Race, Poverty, and Support, 25 YALE J.L. & FEMINISM 317 (2014); Martha Albertson Fineman, The 
Vulnerable Subject and the Responsive State, 60 EMORY L.J. 251, 268 (2010). 
214.  HASDAY, supra note 56, at 196. 
215.  Id.; see also State v. Oakley, 629 N.W.2d 200, 216, 219 (Wis. 2001) (Bradley, J., 
dissenting) (“[T]he majority imbues a fundamental liberty interest [the right to have children] with a 
sliding scale of wealth.”); ROBERTS, SHATTERED BONDS, supra note 203. 
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engage in highly invasive regulation of poor individuals under the ambit of 
criminal law as well.216 
To the extent that one doubts the deterrence rationale invoked by 
criminalizing the failure to pay child support, a Wisconsin case epitomizes 
the lengths to which courts will go to deter reproduction by potential 
parents who may not have the money to support a child.217 David Oakley 
was convicted of the crime of intentionally failing to pay child support for 
his nine children—although there was some dispute about whether he had 
the ability to pay, according to the dissent.218 The court imposed as a 
condition of probation the requirement that he not have any other children 
“unless he demonstrate[d] that he had the ability to support them and that 
he [was] supporting the children he already had.”219 Oakley appealed, but 
the Wisconsin Supreme Court upheld the condition because he “could have 
been imprisoned for six years, which would have eliminated his right to 
procreate altogether during those six years”; therefore, the court found, a 
probation condition that he “avoid having another child” did not infringe on 
his fundamental constitutional “right to procreate.”220 Rather, it facilitated 
probation’s goal of rehabilitating Mr. Oakley221 and provided “his child 
victims and any future child victims with some measure of protection from 
any of Oakley’s future acts that may violate the law.”222 In other words, 
legally prohibiting Mr. Oakley from engaging in unprotected sexual acti-
vity is a permissible method of specifically deterring Mr. Oakley from 
creating “any future child victims” that he might be unable to financially 
 
216.  See, e.g., BRIDGES, supra note 203; KAARYN S. GUSTAFSON, CHEATING WELFARE: PUBLIC 
ASSISTANCE AND THE CRIMINALIZATION OF POVERTY (2011); ROBERTS, KILLING THE BLACK BODY, 
supra note 203; ROBERTS, SHATTERED BONDS, supra note 203, at 200–20; Kaaryn Gustafson, 
Degradation Ceremonies and the Criminalization of Low-Income Women, 3 U.C. IRVINE L. REV. 297 
(2013); Kaaryn Gustafson, The Criminalization of Poverty, Criminal Law, 99 J. CRIM. L. & 
CRIMINOLOGY 643 (2009); Cortney E. Lollar, Criminalizing Pregnancy, 92 IND. L.J. 947 (2017); see 
also Kate Weisburd, Sentenced to Surveillance (Oct. 19, 2017) (unpublished manuscript) (on file with 
author). 
        217.    See Oakley, 629 N.W.2d at 200. 
218.  Id. at 217–18 (Bradley, J., dissenting) (“The [circuit] court explained that ‘it would always 
be a struggle to support these children and in truth [Oakley] could not reasonably be expected to fully 
support them. . . . [Y]ou know and I know . . . [y]ou’re going to struggle to make 25 or 30 [thousand 
dollars a year]. And by the time you take care of your taxes and your social security, there isn’t a whole 
lot to go around, and then you’ve got to ship it out to various children.’”). 
219.  Id. at 203 (majority opinion). 
220.  Id. at 201–02. 
221.  Id. at 205–07. 
222.  Id. at 209. 
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support.223 This method of deterrence, the court seems to indicate, is the 
price of pleasure.224 
As the dissent noted, “[t]he majority’s decision allows . . . the birth of a 
child to carry criminal sanctions,” making it “the only court in the country 
to declare constitutional a condition that limits a probationer’s right to 
procreate based on his financial ability to support his children.”225 Al-
though the dissent is technically correct, the majority’s decision only goes a 
step beyond what most laws already encourage, merely taking our approach 
to child support obligations to its logical conclusion. Child support laws 
discourage people from procreating based on their financial ability to 
support their children; Oakley takes the further step of prohibiting a father 
from procreating based on his limited financial income. The outcome in 
Oakley can be justified and distinguished from what most other courts do 
because the prohibition was imposed as part of a criminal sentence: it was 
permissible because “convicted individuals do not enjoy the same degree of 
liberty as citizens who have not violated the law.”226 But despite its 
distinguishing features, the result in Oakley should not be a surprise, as it 
simply represents the ultimate realization of a criminal-law-based deterrent 
approach. 
Oakley illustrates the type of deterrence permissible under a criminal 
regime, which would be unavailable under a civil system. The curtailment 
of rights seen in Oakley is permissible only after someone has been con-
victed of a crime, even the crime of failing to pay child support. The result 
we see in Oakley would be much harder, if not impossible, for courts to 
accept in a civil or family law setting. Likewise, the Oakley court relies on 
rehabilitation, another theory of punishment invoked primarily in the 
criminal context. Most of the reasons proffered by the majority in support 
of this ultimate form of deterrence rely on the sanction’s presence in the 
criminal system. 
 Deterrence is not the only motivation for placing child support en-
forcement under the ambit of criminal law. Criminal convictions are 
intended to convey moral condemnation and judgment. As a result, crimi-
nalizing the reproductive decisions of poor fathers carries significant 
consequences. If a poor father is convicted for engaging in careless sex that 
resulted in a child he is unable to financially support, he faces not only 
incarceration but also the fairly unshakeable lifelong stigma of a criminal 
 
223.  See id. 
224.  See id. Thank you to Susan Appleton for suggesting this word choice. Shari Motro has used 
the phrase to make a somewhat different point in her article by the same name. See Shari Motro, The 
Price of Pleasure, 104 NW. U. LAW. REV. 917 (2010). I wish to credit her also with this terminology. 
225.  See Oakley, 629 N.W.2d at 216 (Bradley, J., dissenting). 
226.  Id. at 208 (majority opinion). 
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conviction. We have deemed that to be an appropriate response because of 
our moral judgments and beliefs about sex and fatherhood. 
As a result, fathers, whose only crime is failing to financially support 
the mother of their child or to reimburse the state for doing so, face lifelong 
condemnation. The stigma associated with having a criminal conviction is a 
punishment that usually lasts much longer than the more palpable 
deprivations of incarceration, parole, or probation. Being branded a 
“criminal” carries broad, indefinite, and quantifiable ramifications.227 
Although judgment and commitment orders do not articulate this aspect of 
punishment in their official documentation of a person’s criminal sentence, 
a person with a criminal conviction continues to be both legally and prac-
tically “deprived of some of the normal rights of a citizen”228 long after his 
criminal sentence ends. Those additional, often life-long deprivations may 
be tangible deprivations, such as continued disenfranchisement and the 
removal of employment opportunities otherwise available,229 or intangible, 
such as the denial of marital relationships that otherwise might have been 
pursued but for the other’s views of the defendant’s criminal conviction,230 
diminishment of a person’s mental and physical health because of the emo-
tional and physical toll of incarceration, and the stigma of having been 
identified and sanctioned as a “criminal.”231 For most, these life-long 
deprivations are every bit as real a part of the punishment as the technical 
sentence imposed by a judge in a criminal case. 
Most fathers who are convicted and sentenced for failing to pay child 
 
227. See, e.g., Rasmusen, supra note 15; cf. Bronsteen et al., supra note 15, at 1049–55 
(discussing long-term effects of prison on well-being). 
228. John Rawls, Two Concepts of Rules, 64 PHIL. REV. 3, 10 (1955). 
229.  DEVAH PAGER, MARKED: RACE, CRIME, AND FINDING WORK IN AN ERA OF MASS 
INCARCERATION 32–35 (2007); BRUCE WESTERN, PUNISHMENT AND INEQUALITY IN AMERICA 120–25 
(2006); Bruce Western et al., The Labor Market Consequences of Incarceration, 47 CRIME & DELINQ. 
410, 412–13 (2001). Tennessee is the only state that continues to disenfranchise noncustodial parents 
who fail to pay their child support obligations. Policy Briefing, CTR. FOR FAM. POL’Y & PRAC., Oct. 
2012, at 2. 
230. WESTERN, supra note 229, at 146–47; Beth M. Huebner, The Effect of Incarceration on 
Marriage and Work over the Life Course, 22 JUST. Q. 281, 296 (2005); Leonard M. Lopoo & Bruce 
Western, Incarceration and the Formation and Stability of Marital Unions, 67 J. MARRIAGE & FAM. 
721, 721 (2005); Jason Schnittker & Andrea John, Enduring Stigma: The Long-Term Effects of 
Incarceration on Health, 48 J. HEALTH & SOC. BEHAV. 115, 117 (2007); see also VICTOR TADROS, THE 
ENDS OF HARM: THE MORAL FOUNDATIONS OF CRIMINAL LAW 30 (2011) (“[Punishment] destroys and 
hinders the development of relationships between the offender and his family and friends, many of 
whom will feel ashamed and distressed at the punishment of the offender.”). 
231.  Michael Massoglia, Incarceration as Exposure: The Prison, Infectious Disease, and Other 
Stress-Related Illnesses, 49 J. HEALTH & SOC. BEHAV. 56, 57 (2008); Michael Massoglia, 
Incarceration, Health, and Racial Disparities in Health, 42 L. & SOC’Y REV. 275, 296 (2008); 
Schnittker & John, supra note 230, at 125. The decline in physical health begins once someone serves a 
period of incarceration of twelve months and continues beyond their release from prison. Massoglia, 
Incarceration as Exposure, supra note 231, at 67 app. 
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support are ordered to pay the outstanding debt as part of their criminal 
sentence. At this point, the father’s obligation to pay child support stems 
from both an administrative or court order based on paternity and now a 
criminal court order requiring the father to pay the child support as a 
condition of his sentence. A restitution debt imposed as part of a criminal 
sentence is visibly marked as a criminal punishment by its presence on a 
judge’s final disposition order, and it in turn continues to mark the person 
owing restitution as a “criminal.” Both a child support order and a criminal 
restitution order can remain outstanding even after every other aspect of a 
criminal sentence has been completed. Additionally, either order alone can 
be the source of a person’s continued disenfranchisement or failure to 
obtain certain employment opportunities. Both debts are life-long, as 
neither is dischargeable in bankruptcy.232 A child support order is a 
continuing, weighty consequence bearing down on the convicted defendant 
and depriving him of “some of the normal rights of . . . citizen[s].”233 
B. The Crime of Being a Poor Father 
Once we realize that the only explanations for our current child support 
system are deterrence, moral condemnation, and stigma of the reproductive 
decisions of primarily poor fathers who fail to financially provide for their 
children or who fail to reimburse the state for doing so, the question 
becomes how? How did we get to a place as a society where not paying 
child support is worthy of this level of condemnation and sanction? The 
ostensible answer is always the child’s welfare: we punish fathers because 
we care about the well-being of the child. Yet, as we have seen, if child 
welfare were truly the concern, our focus would not be on increasing child 
support payments but on facilitating the child’s relationship with her father 
and increasing state support for all members of the child’s family. 
Although child welfare should be at the heart of our concern, it is not. 
Rather, we punish fathers because they fail to fit the traditional, stereo-
typical image of a white, able-bodied, upper-middle-class father. Very few 
families conform to this image, yet our laws remain wedded to this deeply 
entrenched role—so much so that we are willing to punish men who do not 
conform. 
Underlying our society’s approach to child support obligations are 
strong gender-, class-, and race-based norms. As Laurie Kohn explains, 
 
232.  See A. Mechele Dickerson, Regulating Bankruptcy: Public Choice, Ideology, and Beyond, 
84 WASH. U.L. REV. 1861, 1881–83 (2006); see also, e.g., Kelly v. Robinson, 479 U.S. 36, 53 (1986) 
(holding that criminal restitution orders are not dischargeable in Chapter 7 bankruptcy proceedings); In 
re Verola, 336 B.R. 547, 550–52 (S.D. Fla. 2004) (same). 
233.  See Rawls, supra note 228, at 10. 
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“[t]he legal system expresses the clear message that the role of a father is to 
provide for his children financially, and in fulfilling or failing in that role, a 
father’s value to his children is determined.”234 When fathers fail to fulfill 
that role, they are portrayed as a “deadbeat dad” who is irresponsible at 
best, ill-intentioned and deserving of scorn at worst. If a father is too poor 
to pay, people say, “He should have thought about that before getting 
someone pregnant.” As with all criminal justice interventions in this era, 
men of color, particularly African-American men, are disproportionately 
affected by the decision to treat the failure to pay child support as a crime. 
Throughout our country’s history, “welfare policy has distinguished 
between people presumed able to work, and those presumed unable.”235 As 
one state court said in reference to a defendant whose unemployment led to 
incarceration, he, like any able-bodied adult, should be able to “get a job 
flipping hamburgers at MacDonald’s [sic].”236 Able-bodied men are 
“treated as unworthy of assistance” and punished if they do not work.237 
Able-bodied fathers of no and low income are not only seen as unworthy of 
public assistance, they are seen as the cause of the poverty experienced by 
women with children.238 
The deep legacy of the belief that any man can pull himself up by his 
bootstraps in this country has led many to believe that an able-bodied 
man’s unemployment must be voluntary—some form of laziness.239 If able-
bodied fathers of limited economic means are the cause of mass poverty, 
they also are the potential cure. If they only would go to work and provide 
for their families, poverty would be greatly reduced and child support debts 
would be eliminated. In short, the law places both “the burden and 
responsibility of poverty squarely on the backs of fathers.”240 
Many men embrace this gender role and are ashamed of their seeming 
inability to rise out of their financial circumstances and “man up.” One 
study of low-income African-American men found a significant number 
believe “real men are responsible to provide for themselves and their fami-
lies.”241 Yet many of these men were unable to provide for their families.242 
“African American fathers who [do] not live with their children [are] more 
 
234.  Kohn, supra note 19, at 53. 
235.  Daniel L. Hatcher, Forgotten Fathers, 93 B.U. L. REV. 897, 903 (2013) (quoting Sylvia A. 
Law, Women, Work, Welfare, and the Preservation of Patriarchy, 131 U. PA. L. REV. 1249, 1252–53 
(1983)). 
236.  Moss v. Superior Court, 950 P.2d 59, 63 (Cal. 1998). 
237.  Hatcher, supra note 235, at 902–03. 
238.  Id. at 905, 907. 
239.  Id. at 905. 
240.  Id. at 907. 
241.  Ann C. McGinley, Policing and the Clash of Masculinities, 59 HOW. L.J. 221, 258 (2015). 
242.  Id. 
3 LOLLAR 125-181 (DO NOT DELETE) 10/17/2018  10:52 AM 
168 ALABAMA LAW REVIEW [Vol. 70:1:125 
likely to” be involved in their children’s lives than white or Latino 
fathers.243 But that role is underappreciated both by society and by the law. 
In the conception of father as breadwinner and provider, there is no 
space for other aspects of fathering, such as caretaking; noncash support 
like helping maintain property; providing means for travel or making 
meals; or in-kind contributions in the form of food, clothing, toys, child 
care, or other assistance.244 Fathers are valued solely for their paycheck. 
Many fathers want to be able to contribute, and if they cannot contribute 
financially, they want to be present and make other contributions when 
they are able.245 In fact, many fathers do contribute to their children’s lives 
through the purchasing of goods and services for their children, and they 
prefer this type of contribution to just handing over money to the 
government or the custodial parent.246 The most recent available data shows 
that 61.3% of noncustodial parents provide at least some type of noncash 
support for their children.247 Custodial mothers generally are not opposed 
to these contributions, as especially low-income mothers “often conclude 
that they are more likely to receive money from struggling low-income 
fathers through informal payments.”248 Additionally, mothers often prefer 
to have their child’s father engaged in their child’s life.249 Fathers who 
provide in-kind contributions often deliver them in person, thereby 
facilitating contact between themselves and their children.250 
Class plays a pivotal role in child support law as well. “Most families 
with incomes above $50,000 do not participate in the [child support] 
program.”251 Until the 1970s, child support was not a public issue.252 
“Absent parents were not pursued. . . . Paternity was rarely ascertained.”253 
The primary reason for the shift in approach to child support was because 
Congress wanted to reduce the federal cost of the child welfare system.254 
Prior to the Child Support Act of 1974, “since the Aid to Families with 
Dependent Children (AFDC) system was paying for the child, support 
enforcement seemed quite unnecessary.”255 Any attempts to get fathers to 
 
243.  Huntington, supra note 35, at 190. 
244.  Kohn, supra note 19, at 69, 90–91. 
245.  Id. at 91. 
246.  Kohn, supra note 19, at 91; Maldonado, supra note 30, at 1004–05. 
247.  GRALL, supra note 42, at 14. 
248.  Kohn, supra note 19, at 91. 
249.  Id. at 91–92. 
250.  Maldonado, supra note 30, at 1006. 
251.  SORENSEN, supra note 90, at 3. 
252.  Krause, supra note 211, at 4. 
253.  Id. 
254.  Id. 
255.  Id. at 4. 
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pay child support were quickly dropped as “the funds thus col-
lected . . . would only be offset against AFDC entitlements,”256 and might 
harm family structures by driving fathers away.257 
If people with wealth were failing to pay to support their children, the 
state would have little interest in getting involved. After all, courts and 
legislatures generally emphasize familial privacy and deference to parental 
judgment when the welfare system is not implicated.258 The motivating 
reason for the state’s involvement, both historically and in recent years, is a 
desire to reduce the number of people who rely on the state for support.259 
The state has a fiscal interest in cabining the responsibility for a child’s 
well-being in the private sphere. Laura Rosenbury has articulated: 
[T]he ultimate value underlying legal recognition of [the] family [is] the 
value of private family support. The government affirmatively recognizes 
certain intimate relationships . . . in order to incentivize individuals to 
privately address the dependencies that often arise when adults care for 
children . . . . Indeed, states originally recognized marriage and the parent-
child relationship as a means to encourage men to assume responsibility 
for women’s and children’s dependencies. . . . The government therefore 
recognizes and bestows benefits on families so that they will serve a 
private welfare function, minimizing reliance on state and federal 
coffers. . . . Instead of bestowing positive rights “to cash welfare, to 
housing, or to education,” states bestow the status of spouse, parent, or 
child and attach limited benefits to them.260 
Private solutions appeal not only to people who desire a fiscally conser-
vative government but also to liberal feminists who have felt men should 
 
256.  Id. at 4–5. 
257.  Id. at 5. 
258.  See, e.g., HASDAY, supra note 56, at 196. 
259.  See, e.g., Child Support Enforcement: Hearing Before the S. Comm. on Fin., 104th Cong. 2 
(1995) (opening statement of Sen. Alan K. Simpson, member, S. Comm. On Fin.) (“Child support is 
important in the welfare debate because, if child support is collected, mothers obviously have a better 
chance of staying off welfare.”); STANLEY, supra note 79, at 116 (“There is, in just 
principle, . . . nothing which a government has more clearly the right to do than to compel the lazy to 
work.” (quoting 1 JOEL BISHOP, NEW COMMENTARIES ON THE CRIMINAL LAW UPON A NEW SYSTEM 
OF LEGAL EXPOSITION 273–74 (8th ed. 1892))); Alison Lefkovitz, Men in the House: Race, Welfare, 
and the Regulation of Men’s Sexuality in the United States, 1961–1972, 20 J. HIST. SEXUALITY 594, 
610 (2011) (“Parental failure to support should be made a federal offense—because federal money is 
involved.” (quoting testimony of Stanford University economist Roger Freeman, presidential advisor to 
Presidents Eisenhower and Nixon)); Onwuachi-Willig, supra note 79, at 1654 (“The ultimate goal of 
these governmental efforts was . . . to force freed black people to comport with the heteronormative 
ideal of the nation’s perceived national familial identity—the self-sufficient American family with a 
working husband and a dependent wife and children—and to therefore absolve the government of 
responsibility for financially supporting needy black women and children.” (footnotes omitted)). 
260.  Rosenbury, supra note 202, at 1866–67 (footnotes omitted). 
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be required to financially support the children they chose to bring into the 
world.261 
As a result, legislatures and courts focus on “personal responsibility,” 
by which they “communicate that participating in heterosexual intercourse 
has consequences, at least the risk of legally imposed child support obliga-
tions.”262 If families do not address their own needs as required under this 
legal regime, “the state often intervenes in a punitive fashion.”263 But if 
families have the resources to provide sufficient financial support for their 
dependents, the state grants those family members the benefits of limited 
intervention and disruption of the family relationships, heightened privacy, 
and deference to the family judgments.264 In short, the state defers to 
individual family members’ judgments when those families are middle- and 
upper-class. If the individuals involved in those relationships could provide 
private family support for their children, the state would only be minimally 
involved, if at all—ideal from the state’s perspective. 
The implications of the class-centeredness of these laws cannot be 
overlooked. Fathers with little or no income are more likely to be incar-
cerated for failing to pay their child support obligations.265 The most 
effective mechanism for ensuring compliance with child support obliga-
tions is the garnishment of wages.266 In fact, recent data suggests that 
approximately 72%–75% of child support collections nationwide were 
attributable to the withholding of income from noncustodial parents’ pay-
checks.267 But for fathers with little or no income, wage garnishment is not 
an option, as most of these fathers do not have regular paychecks. As a 
result, noncustodial parents with resources can avoid more significant 
consequences, such as incarceration or a criminal conviction, whereas those 
for whom wage garnishment is not an option face stiffer penalties.268 
Poor fathers are also more likely to be affected by the many collateral 
consequences that attach to child support arrears.269 These collateral 
consequences include withholding of a driver’s or other professional 
license;270 poor credit history; difficultly getting a bank account; and, in the 
 
261.  Appleton, supra note 31, at 363–64; Mayeri, supra note 38, at 2299–300. 
262.  Appleton, supra note 31, at 360. 
263.  Rosenbury, supra note 202, at 1867. 
264.  HASDAY, supra note 56, at 196. 
265.  Brito, supra note 19, at 619–20. 
266.  OFFICE OF CHILD SUPPORT ENF’T, supra note 175, at 34 tbl.P-29; SORENSEN, supra note 90, 
at 5. 
267.  OFFICE OF CHILD SUPPORT ENF’T, supra note 175, at 34 tbl.P-29 (approximating 72% of 
2017 collections); SORENSEN, supra note 90, at 5. 
268.  SOLOMON-FEARS, SMITH & BERRY, supra note 9, at 13; Brito, supra note 19, at 619. 
269.  Hatcher, supra note 235, at 909–10. 
270.  Id. at 910; Kohn, supra note 19, at 70. 
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event one does get a job with a steady paycheck, garnishment of 65% of 
any wages.271 These consequences often have a direct impact on an 
economically disadvantaged father’s work opportunities and access to 
parenting time.272 Whereas a father with sufficient financial means likely 
could work around these hurdles, for someone with little to no income, not 
being able to drive to work or get a professional license that would allow 
for a regular income can have devastating effects. These consequences are 
all in addition to the previously discussed burdens carried by someone with 
a criminal conviction. 
As a result, “[t]he world of child support quickly suffocates poor 
fathers in a combination of deep frustration and apathy.”273 Aggressive 
child support enforcement for those who cannot afford to pay is counter-
productive. The consequence is likely to be reduced payments.274 Similarly, 
“[e]nforcement can alienate a father to the point that he can become 
unwilling to work with the mother to best support their child.”275 These 
results are not beneficial for the child in the middle of this system, the 
custodial parent relying on this income, or the state seeking to receive 
reimbursement. 
Because statistics are not kept, one can only rely on anecdotal evidence 
and inference to reach the inevitable conclusion that race interacts with 
gender and class in the child support system as well. Evidence suggests 
criminalizing the failure to pay child support disproportionately affects 
noncustodial African-American parents.276 More than half of the custodial 
parents who receive both state assistance and child support are people of 
color;277 27% are African-American and 20% are Latino.278 Several studies 
suggest that arrests for nonpayment of child support occur far more often in 
minority communities.279 Certainly disparities in arrest, conviction, and 
incarceration rates between white and black men occur with regularity in 
other areas of the criminal justice system.280 
The invocation of the criminal justice system to address issues of child 
support debt has contributed to the incarceration problem in this country. 
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Black men are disproportionately represented in the prison population. 
Many of them are incarcerated for their failure to pay child support; others 
have child support obligations that remain outstanding during their period 
of incarceration. More than half of all inmates have at least one child under 
the age of eighteen.281 Approximately a quarter of all those incarcerated in 
the U.S. have a child support case.282 These numbers do not account for 
those incarcerated in local jails. 
As previously discussed, a father’s incarceration has a negative effect 
not only on his ability to pay off any debts but also on his ability to support 
a child financially or otherwise.283 More than five million children have a 
parent who lived with them become incarcerated at some point in the 
child’s life, and children of color again are disproportionately affected.284 
Children with an incarcerated parent usually are living in low-income 
families of color, often with a young, single mother of limited education.285 
“African-American and Latino [children] are over seven and two times 
more likely, respectively,” than white children “to have a parent 
incarcerated.”286 
Children encounter numerous barriers to continuing a relationship with 
an incarcerated parent. In addition to the fact that fathers often are incar-
cerated at facilities in far away, inaccessible locations, the nature of a 
child’s interactions with her father are greatly curtailed. Usually there is no 
direct physical contact permitted, conversations are monitored, and the 
length of time one can visit is limited and only permitted during certain 
windows of time.287 Phone calls, which are the most common form of 
communication with an incarcerated parent, are outrageously expensive 
and are monitored by corrections authorities.288 Letters are likewise moni-
tored.289 In short, nothing about the set-up is conducive to encouraging a 
parental relationship. 
Numerous studies document the negative effects of a parent’s 
incarceration on a child’s well-being.290 One recent study indicated that 
approximately two-thirds of fathers never received a visit from their child 
 
281.  Child Support and Incarceration, NAT’L CONFERENCE OF STATE LEGISLATURES (June 6, 
2018), http://www.ncsl.org/research/human-services/child-support-and-incarceration.aspx. 
282.  Id. 
283.  See, e.g., Dennis, supra note 20, at 327–29. 
284.  Id. at 328. 
285.  ANNIE E. CASEY FOUND., supra note 155, at 2. 
286.  Id. 
287.  Dennis, supra note 20, at 328. 
288.  Id. 
289.  Id. 
290.  Id. at 328–29; Kohn, supra note 19, at 85–86. 
3 LOLLAR 125-181 (DO NOT DELETE) 10/17/2018  10:52 AM 
2018] Criminalizing (Poor) Fatherhood 173 
while incarcerated.291 A study of fathers in prison found that almost 42% of 
fathers who did not live with their child prior to incarceration only had 
contact with their child once a month or less.292 Absent fathers can lead to 
increased mental health issues, diminished levels of school achievement, 
disproportionate representation in the juvenile justice system, and greater 
risk of adolescent pregnancy.293 “[F]or children who seek relationships with 
their fathers, paternal interactions can have a significant positive emotional 
impact.”294 As already discussed, when fathers positively engage with their 
children, they can play important roles in the lives and successes of their 
children.295 
The intersectionality of gender, class, and race undergird our child 
support system. Here, we see the well-documented move toward priva-
tizing the family law system and the subsequent effect on poor families 
running headlong into the criminal justice system, with devastating and 
deeply troubling effects. The privatization of family law is used to justify 
criminal sanctions for a failure to pay a private debt or failure to reimburse 
the state so the privatization remains complete. As a result, many men are 
incarcerated in what amounts to a modern-day debtors’ prison. This system 
neither benefits children nor is an effective or cost-efficient system for the 
state. 
IV. PROPOSED SOLUTIONS 
Documenting concerns about the current child support system raises 
numerous questions regarding how best to address the concerns while also 
ensuring that children grow up with the resources and support they need. 
A. The Need for Better and More Transparent Data 
A close analysis of the system reveals just how little information is 
available. According to this author’s research, no state or federal agency 
documents or reports the number of people prosecuted or incarcerated for a 
criminal charge of failing to pay child support.296 Without such data, 
knowing the full extent of the problem is impossible. Any proposal for 
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fixing the system must start with a requirement that states and the federal 
government collect that data. 
Similarly, the data collected by the Office of Child Support 
Enforcement should be separated out in a clear and accessible manner, 
separate from data related to foster care and other programs. Information 
related to how much money is going to reimburse state and federal govern-
ments for state assistance programs should be distinct from that going 
toward the foster care system. Information about the fact that the govern-
ment is both funding and getting reimbursed by the system should be 
clearly identified, and data looking at the system without that subsidy 
should be analyzed. 
B. Changes to the Child Support Calculations 
In order to avoid some of the current problems, the surface level fix 
would simply be to make several changes to the child support system to 
better ensure it protects a child’s welfare. One could argue that we need to 
change the way child support obligations are calculated. Child support 
formulas should be adapted to ensure that the child support ordered actually 
correlates with the father’s ability to pay. Part of this may entail removing 
“potential” income from the calculation, having a more realistic assessment 
of liquid assets in the child support formula, and allowing for easier modifi-
cations of child support orders if a parent’s financial circumstance changes. 
Child support obligations should be suspended while a parent is incar-
cerated, and the law should be changed so interest no longer accrues on 
child support obligations. 
Last year, the federal Office of Child Support Enforcement (OCSE), 
which works with state and tribal governments to enforce and facilitate 
consistent child support payments, modified the federal regulations gover-
ning child support orders to try and ensure that the amount of child support 
ordered more closely matches the noncustodial parent’s actual income.297 
For example, the Department of Health and Human Services (DHHS) 
recently promulgated a federal regulation entitled “Flexibility, Efficiency, 
and Modernization in Child Support Enforcement Programs,” whose aim is 
to “give states needed flexibility to increase the accuracy and accounta-
bility of support orders.”298 According to an overview released by DHHS, 
“[r]esearch finds that setting an accurate order based upon the noncustodial 
parent’s ability to pay improves the chances that the parent will comply 
 
297.  See U.S. DEP’T HEALTH & HUMAN SERVS., supra note 8. 
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with the support order and continue to pay over time.”299 
The recent changes also allow for new consideration of a parent’s 
incarceration. Prior to the passage of this regulation, most states barred 
noncustodial parents from seeking review and adjustment of their child 
support obligations if they were incarcerated, thus treating incarceration as 
“voluntary unemployment.” Recognizing that those who are incarcerated 
“usually have limited earnings ability while in prison,” leading to the 
accrual of “tens of thousands of dollars of child support debt that interfere 
with employment success, [and] resulting in higher rates of nonpayment 
upon release from prison,” the new regulation requires that a state “not 
exclude incarceration from consideration as a substantial change in circum-
stances, such as by treating incarceration as ‘voluntary unemployment.’”300 
“[A]fter learning that a parent who owes support will be incarcerated for 
more than 180 calendar days, the state must either send a notice to both 
parents of the right to request a review and adjustment or automatically 
initiate a review and adjustment after notifying both parents.”301 
Similarly, in a promising move, the new regulation allows a custodial 
parent to seek help in establishing paternity through child support services 
without requiring the court to impose a child support obligation if paternity 
is ascertained and neither parent desires such an obligation.302 It also allows 
for states to close cases if a court has determined that collection of the 
support obligation is “extremely unlikely based on the circumstances, such 
as very serious work-limiting disability of the noncustodial parent.”303 
These new provisions went into effect in early 2017.304 As a result, it is 
too soon to tell whether they will be implemented in a manner that is 
effective in reducing child support debt and helping noncustodial parents 
and their children. By removing at least one obstacle toward cooperation 
between a child’s parents—namely the requirement that the court impose 
child support once paternity is ascertained, whether the custodial parent 
wants that or not—the new regulation opens the door to other legal changes 
that might help to strengthen the position of poor and working-class 
fathers. 
C. Eliminating Debtors’ Prisons 
A requisite first step in keeping people from being incarcerated for 
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failing to pay child support is the decriminalization of the act. At the very 
least, removing criminal sanctions would lead to less incarceration for 
failing to pay than we currently have, and it would eliminate the stigma and 
the collateral consequences that attend a criminal conviction. Yet, as has 
been discussed at length in the context of the decriminalization of other 
misdemeanors, decriminalization can have significant downsides. 
Professor Alexandra Natapoff has written extensively about the nega-
tive consequences that accompany decriminalization. Professor Natapoff 
explains, 
   [D]ecriminalization represents the next generation of the “net-
widening” phenomenon. Net-widening refers to reforms that make it 
easier to sweep individuals into the criminal process, and decrimi-
nalization does so in sophisticated ways. . . . [It does so] by turning to 
supervision and fines as indirect, long-term constraints on defendant 
behavior, and by extending the informal consequences of a citation or 
conviction deep into offenders’ social and economic lives. . . .  
   . . . .  
   . . . [Decriminalization] exemplifies a larger institutional and social 
compromise: the embrace of more diffuse and less formal modes of 
punishment as a way of adapting America’s massive criminal apparatus to 
a new age of resource scarcity and unease about mass incarceration.305 
One can certainly envision how removing criminal sanctions from the 
child support system could still have the negative effects Professor 
Natapoff discusses. Already with civil enforcement procedures in place, a 
noncustodial parent delinquent on his child support obligations can be 
incarcerated for an unpredictable period of time without ever seeing a 
lawyer.306 Although the stigma and collateral consequences of a criminal 
conviction are absent, this option does not seem dramatically better for the 
father, the child, or the state. Incarceration through this type of “punitive 
injunction” will not make the father any more able to pay than he was prior 
to the incarceration.307 Rather, this approach becomes just another way of 
“manag[ing] the poor and socially marginal”308 and sending a message 
about the “moral depravity” of fathers who are in this position.309 
Despite these apparent downsides, legislators should still decriminalize 
the failure to pay child support. But in addition, incarceration should be 
removed as a punishment for civil contempt, the charge states use to punish 
so-called “deadbeat dads” on the civil side. Legislatures should adopt the 
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language proposed by Professor Natapoff: “No defendant shall be incar-
cerated for civil contempt or given extended supervision or probation 
solely because of a failure to make full payments of fees, fines, or costs 
under this provision.”310 As Natapoff points out, this type of statutory 
language would “bring civil contempt into closer alignment with 
constitutional doctrine that constrains criminal law,” alluding to Bearden 
and its predecessor cases.311 Similarly, the law should make clear that civil 
offenses, such as civil contempt, “do not give rise to a criminal record or 
other collateral consequences.”312 
Legislators should also remove the federal requirement that custodial 
parents “assign” their child support income to the government when they 
seek state assistance. Poor fathers should not be financing the state’s 
“welfare” program or facing any sort of sanction if they are unable to do so. 
States should budget their state assistance programs without counting on 
this income. 
Although they number fewer than most people think, parents who have 
the ability to pay but are not actually paying child support do exist. As 
previously indicated, however, those with the ability to pay are usually not 
the ones who end up with a criminal record or sanctions. Wage garnish-
ment and tax refund offsets are effective ways of getting payments from 
those more well-to-do individuals. 
D. Define “Child Support” More Broadly 
In recognition of the current practice in many families and the desires 
of many custodial and noncustodial parents, the child support system 
should recognize and value a noncustodial parent’s nonfinancial contribu-
tions equal to the financial ones. If having the father present in his child’s 
life is most important for the child’s development and well-being, the law 
should recognize as much and facilitate, rather than impede, these inter-
actions. If criminal sanctions and incarceration are removed as barriers to a 
father’s interactions with his child, those changes, in conjunction with a 
legal recognition of a father’s full range of parenting skills, will go a long 
way toward encouraging a father’s presence in his child’s life. 
Changing the law to permit in-kind contributions would help remove 
some of the barriers to father–child engagement, as evidence has shown 
that in-kind contributions encourage paternal involvement.313 Many Afri-
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can-American fathers with little to no income regularly make in-kind 
contributions.314 In fact, fathers with little to no income often prefer to 
make in-kind contributions, viewing the purchase of a few “symbolically 
important items” such as diapers, baby formula, and shoes as of “greater 
value and significance” than making cash payments.315 These contributions 
can feel more visible and enduring than cash contributions.316 
As Laurie Kohn has suggested, noncash support could be utilized in a 
manner similar to that provided by the guidelines regulating child support 
on Native-American land.317 Federal regulations permit Native American 
tribes to allow “noncash payments” to satisfy child support obligations.318 
The child support order outlines the specific dollar amount of the child 
support obligation and what type of noncash support will be permitted to 
satisfy that particular dollar amount.319 An OCSE publication provides an 
example: 
[A] [t]ribal support order could provide that an obligor owes $200 a 
month in current support, which may be satisfied with the provision of 
firewood suitable for home heating and cooling to the custodial parent and 
child. The order could provide that a cord of firewood has a specific 
dollar value of $100 based on the prevailing market. Therefore, the 
obligor would satisfy his support obligation by providing two cords of 
firewood every month.320 
Fathers also should be encouraged to be both caregivers and bread-
winners.321 Many fathers want to spend time with their children but feel 
they should only do so if they have money to spend on them.322 The law 
should aid fathers in engaging in caretaking responsibilities, thereby increa-
sing their involvement in their children’s lives. In fact, many African-
American fathers with little income see their children regularly.323 These 
fathers “take their children to and from school, help [their children] 
with . . . homework, take them to the doctor, and [spend time with] them 
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while their mothers [are at] work or run[ning] errands.”324 As with in-kind 
contributions, the law should find a way to value these interactions and take 
them into consideration as part of the father’s support obligation. 
Of course, there may be times when encouraging a child’s “high-
quality relationship with each parent”325 is not feasible. For example, if a 
father has been abusive to the child, fostering a relationship with him 
simply may not be a good option. As others have recognized, “it is essential 
that the reforms not compromise safety.”326 Likewise, there may be times 
when one parent is not particularly interested in having a relationship with 
his or her child. The changes proposed here are not intended to require a 
parent’s involvement in his or her child’s life; rather, they are meant to 
facilitate the child’s relationship with each parent to the extent that relation-
ship is desired by both parties. Unfortunately, nothing the law can do will 
cause a parent to have a change of heart regarding the desire to participate 
in the life of his or her child. But the law can remove obstacles in a manner 
that encourages parents who want that relationship to be able to have it. 
E. Establishing Support Services for Poor Fathers 
A family’s resources can affect a child’s development. As a result, at 
the time when a court enters a child support order, a realistic assessment of 
the father’s earning potential should be established. Currently, not all states 
require a noncustodial parent to be present when a child support order is 
entered. As a result, the noncustodial parent cannot advocate for himself 
and inform the court or administrative hearing officer of his income status. 
Instead, courts and administrative officers are dependent on the custodial 
parent’s assessment of her coparent’s resources. The law should prohibit 
courts and administrative officers from entering child support orders in 
absentia. Otherwise, courts will have a difficult time accurately assessing a 
father’s earning potential. 
Once that change is made, an additional part of the process should 
include identifying those fathers who are lacking in education or vocational 
training or who are suffering from some type of disability that might 
prevent them from contributing financially to their children’s upbringing. 
Each state already has a variety of resources in place through the Depart-
ment of Education to work with people who need rehabilitation and job 
training. A mechanism should be put in place to connect these particularly 
vulnerable fathers with the already-existing state Divisions of Vocational 
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Services and Rehabilitation Services Administrations who can help them 
with job training and vocational rehabilitative services. Because these pro-
grams already exist, this proposal would be a cost-effective method of 
helping these fathers expand their options and increase the chances that 
they might be able to financially contribute to their children’s upbringing. 
F. Re-envisioning the Child Support System? 
Although the changes discussed in the previous parts might make our 
current child support system better, simply amending the current system 
does not address the deeper question of whether the current child support 
system is so fundamentally broken that we should abandon it in favor of a 
new approach. One issue raised by this Article is whether the child support 
system should be regulated by states at all. In almost no other area do states 
regulate the enforcement of debts between two private parties. With child 
support obligations, not only do states heavily regulate the enforcement of 
those debts, but federal and state laws also prohibit a noncustodial parent 
from discharging the debt in bankruptcy proceedings. In other words, if a 
noncustodial parent incurs child support debt, he will be stuck with that 
debt and the interest it accrues for life. 
For that portion of child support debt that a noncustodial parent owes to 
the state to reimburse it and the federal government for the costs of state 
assistance provided to the custodial parent, the set-up is equally, if not 
more, problematic. Although the government has long been reluctant to 
provide financial assistance to those who are poor and struggling to make 
ends meet, the reality is that every state and the federal government 
continue to have some version of state assistance. Many find the argument 
that the state should step in and ensure that everyone has some minimal 
level of provisions persuasive: “If fathers do not pay child support, then the 
state pays what the mother is owed.”327 Most do not realize that the state is 
expecting noncustodial parents with little to no income to reimburse the 
state for those obligations. Certainly for noncustodial parents who are in a 
position to do so, that reimbursement might be appropriate. But most of the 
custodial parents who are requesting and receiving state assistance do not 
share a child with a noncustodial parent of such means. The state’s expec-
tation of reimbursement from these fathers of no and low income seems 
unrealistic. 
Yet the state goes beyond simply expecting a poor father to reimburse 
the costs of state assistance. The state expends additional resources to 
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enforce this financial obligation. In fact, the Office of Child Support 
Enforcement’s very name exemplifies this focus. The government spends 
money to track down the noncustodial parent and take them to court in 
order to try to get money from parents who usually do not have any, or 
very little, to give. Every year, the government spends money trying to 
establish paternity in approximately one and a half million cases in order to 
get these fathers under supervision of the child support system.328 In 2016, 
over 1.7 million cases “[r]equir[ed] [s]ervices to [e]stablish a [s]upport 
[o]rder.”329 In the event a father does not pay, additional state money is 
spent incarcerating him to try to obtain payment. This is not a cost-effective 
system, and it certainly does nothing to help the welfare of the child or the 
fiscal well-being of the state, as has already been discussed. 
This Article could take the position that the current child support 
system should be entirely dismantled and replaced with a different method 
of helping children grow and flourish despite coming from a family with 
little or no income. The odds of such a dramatic change occurring are slim, 
however, and despite the strong appeal of this proposal, this author has 
chosen to consider more realistic options that might actually have a chance 
of successfully being implemented. Many of the changes outlined above 
could go far toward making the child support system a very different and 
better functioning system. 
CONCLUSION 
The child support system “perpetuates the traditional gender norm that 
fathers are valuable only as breadwinners.”330 Ultimately, only if we are 
able to unmoor our deeply class- and race-based ideas about gender roles 
will we be in a position to effectively change our laws to encourage fathers 
to realize their full potential, which will in turn allow their children and 
their children’s mothers to fully embrace their own paths. 
For now, the child support system remains yet another government 
program that reinforces cycles of poverty and criminal justice involvement 
for poor fathers. Criminal law should not play a role in sanctioning people 
for failing to pay either a private debt or a public debt incurred because the 
person’s former partner sought state assistance. Instead, legislators and 
courts should make changes to the child support system so that it more 
effectively promotes and protects a child’s well-being. 
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